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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THE EFFECTS OF DESTRUCTION: A MACROECONOMIC STORY
Destructive events such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks occur not only in
developing economies but also developed economies. Consequently, the response of
these economies has been observed in case of both type of events. This dissertation
is a collection of essays regarding natural disasters, terrorist attacks and the macroe-
conomy. Specifically, I examine the response of local labor markets that reflect a
wide spectrum of economies, but also have a safety-net in the form of being part of
a developed country in the aftermath of a violent tornado. Further, I explore the
heterogeneity in the economies response to natural disasters and terrorist attacks.
Additionally, I investigate the effects of terrorism on growth and its disaggregated
value added components.
The first chapter focuses on the effects of tornadoes on local labor markets. I examine
the change in local labor markets caused by extreme tornadoes that occur in counties
of the contiguous United States. I also investigate the effect these tornadoes have
on neighboring counties and evaluate the labor market response in urban and rural
counties separately as well. Using a generalized difference-in-difference approach on
quarterly data spanning from 1975 to 2016, I find that counties experience persis-
tently higher wages per worker two years following a violent tornado. The effects on
urban county can be observed on employment, while the effect in the rural county is
observed on wages per worker. Further, evaluating the response of labor markets by
sectors reveals the industrial sectors that experience increased labor market activity.
The second chapter evaluates the long-run effects of natural disasters and terrorist
attacks on growth and the channels through which they affect growth. Using the
conceptual framework of a Solow-Swan model I examine an unbalanced annual panel
of 125 countries spanning from 1970 to 2015 and find that domestic terrorist attacks,
floods, and storms have a similar negative effect on growth, while transnational terror-
ist attacks and earthquakes have no significant effect on growth. Examining the chan-
nels through which they affect growth brings to the forefront the differences between
these different types of events. I find that domestic terrorist attacks lead to increased
military expenditures in their wake, while floods lead to increased non-military expen-
ditures in their aftermath. Reviewing the data by developed and emerging economies
reveals that developed economies are better able to absorb the shock of terrorist at-
tacks as well as natural disasters. I find that although emerging economies are able
to absorb the shock of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks, they experience
some adverse effects from floods and storms.
The third chapter examines the path of GDP growth and its disaggregated industrial,
service, and agricultural sector value added components in the aftermath of two types
of terrorism - transnational and domestic terrorism. Using a panel VAR model on
cross country annual data from 1970 to 2015 I find that fatalities caused by neither do-
mestic nor transnational terrorist attacks lead to a significant change in GDP growth.
Examining the disaggregated industrial, service, and agricultural sector components
of GDP growth reveals that even disaggregated the value added components of GDP
growth experience no adverse effects from the deaths caused by transnational and
domestic terrorist attacks. I also distinguish the emerging economies from the entire
sample to find that GDP growth in emerging economies experience no significant
effects due to the casualties of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks.
KEYWORDS: Natural Disasters; Terrorist Attacks; Growth; Employment; Wage per
worker
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Chapter 1 Introduction
The tsunami of 2004 that affected several coastal countries of the Indian Ocean was
the largest of its kind in the last several decades. The US Geological Survey said that
it believed the Tsunami in 2004 released energy equivalent to 23,000 Hiroshima-type
atomic bombs. Considering this magnitude, it would not be a surprise if its impact
were still visible in these countries. Although natural disasters that cause devastation
of such a large magnitude are few, their occurrence nevertheless makes disaster man-
agement an important aspect of effective governance. Compared to natural disasters,
terrorist attacks are smaller and more targeted, but they too have the potential of
lasting ramifications. For example, the terrorist attack in the United States in 2001
and in India in 2008 both led to widespread changes in security measures. A similar
change in security measures can be observed in the aftermath of many domestic and
transnational terrorist attacks.
Understanding the economic costs associated with these different types of destructive
events could aid policymakers to better gauge the benefits of implementing disaster
management tools in case of either of these negative shocks. In response to this a
vast body of literature has emerged regarding natural disasters as well as terrorist
attacks. Despite this, there is more to explore about the effects that these events
can have on the macroeconomy. In this dissertation, I first examine the effects of a
specific natural disaster – tornadoes – on local labor markets across the United States.
Incomes and labor market conditions vary across these locations, but are located in a
developed country. In the next two chapters, I use cross-country data to investigate
the effects of a broad range of natural disasters and terrorist attacks on growth and
its components.
In the first chapter, I focus on the change in local labor markets caused by extreme
1
tornadoes that occur in counties of the contiguous United States. Each year, on
average, the U.S. experiences 1,200 tornadoes. These tornadoes kill 60 people, injure
1,500 people, and cause damages of over $400 million. Disaster management and its
effectiveness is therefore an important aspect of governance for local governments.
While a robust empirical literature regarding the effects of less commonly occurring
natural disasters like hurricanes in the U.S. exists, few studies focus on the effects of
tornadoes.
I use data from Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census on Employment and
Wages from 1975:Q1 – 2016:Q4. Using a generalized difference-in-difference approach
on these quarterly data, I find that violent tornadoes lead to persistently higher wages
per worker two years following a tornado. I also evaluate the labor market response
separately for urban and rural counties and find that the effects on an urban county
can be observed as an increase in employment, while the effect in a rural county
is observed as an increase in wages per worker. Additionally, I also examine the
response of labor markets by sectors to identify the industrial sectors that experience
increased labor market activity. I find that the construction sector experiences higher
labor demand a quarter after a violent tornado. Finance, insurance, and real estate
(FIRE) experiences higher demand for its services in the aftermath of tornadoes.
Terrorist attacks and natural disasters are instances of exogenous negative shocks
that can affect both human and physical capital. Although the magnitude of the
shock varies considerably, a vast body of literature on terrorist attacks and natural
disasters have found similar negative effects on GDP growth. In the second chapter,
I examine the long-run effects of natural disasters and terrorist attacks on growth
and the transmission channels through which they affect growth using a common
conceptual framework.
I use World Bank’s World Development Indicator data combined with Emergency
Disaster Database (EM-DAT) and Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to compile
2
an unbalanced annual panel of 125 countries spanning from 1970 to 2015. I find
that domestic terrorist attacks, floods, and storms have a similar negative effect
on growth, while transnational terrorist attacks and earthquakes have no significant
effect on growth. Further, evaluating the channels through which they affect growth,
I find that domestic terrorist attacks lead to increased military expenditures in their
wake, while floods lead to increased non-military expenditures in their aftermath.
Additionally, examining the data by developed and emerging economies reveals that
developed economies are better able to absorb the shock of terrorist attacks as well
as natural disasters. However, I find that although emerging economies are able to
absorb the shock of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks, they experience
some adverse effects from floods and storms.
The third chapter examines the path of GDP growth and its disaggregated industrial,
service, and agricultural sector value added components in the aftermath of two types
of terrorism - transnational and domestic terrorism. Transnational and domestic
terrorist attacks, aim to cause the most damage on the economies of the countries
that they target. Several studies have found that terrorist attacks increase uncertainty
leading to decreased foreign direct investment (FDI). For emerging economies, FDI
is a crucial source of financing. Hence, examining the response of growth and its
disaggregated industrial, service, and agricultural sector value added component can
help quantify the effect that terrorism has on an economy through the obstruction of
normal business operations.
Using a panel VAR model on an unbalanced annual panel of 109 countries spanning
from 1970 to 2015, I find that casualties caused by domestic terrorism and transna-
tional terrorism lead to no significant change in GDP growth. Further examining the
disaggregated industrial, service, and agricultural sector components of GDP growth
reveals that the disaggregated sectors too remain unaffected by the fatalities caused
by these terrorist attacks. Additionally, evaluating the response of GDP growth and
3
its value added components for only emerging economies, I find that GDP growth in
emerging economies experience no significant adverse effects from the deaths caused
by transnational and domestic terrorist attacks.
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Chapter 2 The Effect of Tornadoes on Local Labor Markets
2.1 Introduction
On May 22, 2011, the seventh deadliest tornado in U.S. history struck Joplin, Mis-
souri, resulting in losses of over $2 billion in 2011 US Dollars1. The U.S. experiences
about 1,200 tornadoes that on average, kill 60 people, injure 1,500 people and cause
more than $400 million in damages each year 2. These damages do not take into
consideration the economic impact in the aftermath of the tornado. In this chapter,
I examine the economic impact of tornadoes on local economies.
Tornadoes are one of the most common natural disasters that occur in the United
States3. Unlike hurricanes that mostly occur in the Gulf and the Southeastern states,
and earthquakes that mostly occur in the west, tornadoes can occur almost anywhere
in the US4. Hence, they are also geographically dispersed across the country as can be
seen in figure 2.1. Despite the frequent occurrence and the vast geographic dispersion,
very few studies focus on the effects of tornadoes on the local economy.
For local governments, disaster management and its effectiveness is an important
aspect of governance. Research about the economic aftermath of tornadoes can aid
local governments make disaster management related decisions. In this chapter, I
focus on the effects of tornadoes across the contiguous US on employment and wages.
I find that while violent (EF4 and EF5) tornadoes result in no significant change
in employment in a directly affected county for a two-year duration after the event,
wages per worker are persistently higher in the affected county at the end of the same
1http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/20110920_joplin.html
https://www.joplinmo.org/DocumentCenter/View/1985/Joplin_Tornado_factsheet
https://www.thebalance.com/tornado-damage-to-the-economy-3305667
2http://www.crh.noaa.gov/Image/dvn/downloads/quickfacts_Tornadoes.pdf
3https://www.toptenreviews.com/the-10-most-common-natural-disasters-in-the-us
4https://www.spc.noaa.gov/faq/tornado/
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duration. The results show that the effects of a violent tornado are not as short lived
as one would expect. The results also imply that at the end of two years demand due
to reconstruction effort leads to a rise in wage growth.
This chapter is related to several articles by Ewing et al. (2003, 2004, 2009) that
focus on the effect of specific tornado incidents on employment growth. Ewing et al.
(2003) focuses on the 2000 Fort Worth tornado, while Ewing et al. (2004) examines
the 1998 Nashville tornado, and Ewing et al. (2009) focuses on the 1999 Oklahoma
City tornado. These papers focus on specific tornadoes that occurred within a few
years of each other. However, examining several tornadoes simultaneously over an
extended period allows me to present a more comprehensive analysis of the effect of
tornadoes on labor markets.
Ewing et al. (2004, 2009) also examine the response of labor markets on different
industrial sectors. They find that construction experienced a positive shift in employ-
ment growth while the finance, insurance and real estate sector experienced a positive
shift in employment growth in Oklahoma City and a negative shift in Nashville in
the wake of a F5 tornado. The magnitude and direction of the effect on different
industries is an empirical question to be investigated. This chapter examines the
response of labor markets by sectors to deduce the response that can be expected in
the aftermath of a tornado. The sectors examined in this chapter are construction;
manufacturing; finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE); trade, transportation, and
utility (hereafter TTU); services; mining; and agriculture. Investigating the response
of the labor market of each of these sectors exhibits the heterogeneity in their re-
sponses to tornadoes. I find that the construction sector experiences higher labor
demand a quarter after the tornado as suggested by the higher employment and
wages per worker. I also find that the FIRE sector experiences eventual but persis-
tently higher employment in the directly affected county indicating greater activity
in that sector in the aftermath of a tornado.
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Other papers that are closely related to this chapter are papers by Belasen and Po-
lachek (2008, 2009) who examine the effect of hurricanes on local labor markets and
Pietro and Mora (2015) who evaluate the effect of an earthquake on labor markets.
Belasen and Polachek (2009) focus on hurricanes that occur in Florida counties be-
tween 1988 and 2005. Using a generalized difference-in-difference method, they find
that hurricanes decrease employment while increasing wages in the county that suffers
the hurricane, indicating that hurricanes result in a negative shift in the supply curve
of the labor market of the affected county. Belasen and Polachek (2008) also examine
the effects that hurricanes have on the labor markets for broadly defined industrial
sectors. Using the same data and methodology as Belasen and Polachek (2009), they
find that hurricanes generally represent unexpected increase in labor demand in the
directly hit counties since employment and earnings move in the same direction for
each of the industrial sectors. Pietro and Mora (2015) focus on the earthquake in
L’Aquila, Italy, that occurred on April 6, 2009. They examine quarterly data from
2009 to 2010 using difference-in-difference approach and find that the earthquake led
to a decline in the probability of participating in the labor force for a period of nine
months after the earthquake.
Studies evaluating the economic effect of natural disasters have been both cross-
country and cross-US county. Cross-country studies largely examine the effect of sev-
eral types of natural disasters on economic growth and the channels through which
they affect growth. Some of these studies find that natural disasters have a positive
effect on growth (Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Skidmore and Toya, 2002). However, the
vast majority of studies find that natural disasters influence growth negatively (Rad-
datz, 2009; Jaramillo, 2009; Cavallo et al., 2013; Hochrainer, 2009; Cuaresma et al.,
2008; Hallegatte and Dumas, 2009; Noy and Nualsri, 2007). Other studies focus on
the differential effects of natural disasters on developing and developed countries and
find that the adverse effect on growth of developing countries is much larger than
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on developed countries (Noy, 2009; Fomby et al. 2013). Focusing on counties in the
United States provides a unique opportunity to examine a smaller economy within
a developed country. Additionally, cross-US county studies have the advantage of
focusing on some microeconomic activities that affect the economy of these counties.
Several studies have taken advantage of this unique situation. Boustan et al. (2017)
examine the effect of natural disasters on migration and housing prices at the US
county level. Strobl (2011) explores the effect of hurricanes on income growth of
coastal counties, and Belasen and Polachek (2008, 2009) evaluate the effect of hurri-
canes on local labor markets in Florida. This chapter adds to this body of natural
disaster literature by focusing on the effect of a specific natural disaster, tornadoes,
on the local labor market.
Fomby et al. (2013) find that the response to natural disasters varies between agri-
cultural and non-agricultural GDP growth. This would suggest that there may exist
heterogeneous effects between urban and rural regions. Focusing on counties for this
study allows me to study the heterogeneous effects of tornadoes on urban and rural
counties following the cross-country literature that examines the differential effects
between developed and developing countries. Estimating the model separately for
rural and urban counties, I find that a strong positive effect is observed on the em-
ployment levels of an urban county that is struck by a tornado. Labor markets
in rural affected counties on the other hand are affected through higher wages per
worker. This suggests that rural counties need to provide more of an incentive to
attract labor.
2.2 Economic Framework of a Tornado Shock
In a standard labor demand and labor supply model an exogenous negative shock
has the potential to influence both labor supply and labor demand. A tornado can
be that exogenous negative shock to the labor market, since a tornado could result
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in disruption of production and regular economic activity due to the destruction of
capital stock and even the loss of human life, though, casualties in the United States
due to tornadoes tend to be small. Boustan et al. (2012) find that, on net, young men
move away from areas struck by tornado to areas experiencing floods. As people flee
the destruction caused by extremely large tornadoes creating a negative influence on
labor supply, businesses attempt to fill this void created by fatalities, injuries and even
migration of people, which creates positive pressure on labor demand. Thus the initial
effect is unknown due to these two counter-acting forces. After the initial shock of the
tornado, once reconstruction efforts kick in, labor demand would further experience
a positive movement, and labor supply may flow in to offset the demand. The later
shifts in labor supply and labor demand could shift the labor market equilibrium.
Whether this is a positive or negative shift in equilibrium is ambiguous and may
differ by sector.
The response to a negative shock can depend on the perception that agents in an
economy have of the shock. A persistent negative shock may lead to more long
lasting responses. Studies by Boustan et al. (2012) and (2017) suggest that there are
individuals that perceive a tornado shock to be persistent. Boustan et al. (2012) find
that on net young men out-migrate from areas that experience a tornado. Boustan
et al. (2017) find that counties affected by severe disasters experience greater out-
migration. Out-migration may therefore lead to a decline in labor supply in a county
that experiences a tornado. However, at the same time there are individuals that stay
in the county despite the massive destruction. Lucas and Rapping (1969) find that
individuals tend not to alter their long-term expectations if they perceive a shock to
be temporary. It can be because these individuals perceive the tornado shock to be
temporary that they don’t alter their long-term expectations and stay in the same
area. Hence, the magnitude of the shift in labor supply is ambiguous and depends
on the perceptions and decisions of individuals in the area.
9
Over the years, technology has made it possible to issue advance warnings of tor-
nadoes. The average lead time of tornado warnings is 13 minutes5. Simmons et al.
(2013) normalize tornado damages in the United States and find a sharp decline in
tornado damages. Simmons and Sutter (2005) find that expected fatalities and in-
juries fell significantly after the installation of WSR-88D radars across the country.
However, the more accurate warning system is not the fail-safe that it could be. Peo-
ple also rely on other sources of information like a visual of the tornado to heed a
tornado warning during the daytime (Bakkensen, 2016). Even though technology has
made it possible to reduce casualties, the warnings are unable to stop or reduce the
destruction of physical capital.
A decline in physical capital increases the marginal product of capital, giving rise
to increased investment. This in turn, should speed up recovery (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 2003). Financial aid, disaster assistance, clean-up and recovery tend to
be a counter-acting positive shock (Horowich, 2000). After the initial shock of the
tornado, once reconstruction efforts to restore the damaged physical capital kicks in,
demand for labor would increase. This increase in labor demand could be offset by
in-migration of individuals that foresee labor market opportunity leading to a shift
in the labor market outcomes from its pre-tornado levels. With time, labor demand
and supply may adjust as reconstruction requirements evolve. As a result, the labor
market may experience some fluctuation around its steady state. These shifts and
adjustments inform us about a relatively longer period effect of a tornado on the
labor market outcomes.
The proximity of counties means that individuals living in tornado struck counties
may be employed in a neighboring county. This would suggest some spill-over effects
in the neighboring counties due to out-migration. A neighboring county may also
receive some spill-over from disaster assistance. For instance, first responders may
5http://www.noaa.gov/stories/tornadoes-101
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choose a neighboring county as a base of operation and increase economic activity
in that county. Belasen and Polachek (2008, 2009) find some spillover effects of
hurricanes. They find that extremely large hurricanes lead to no significant change
in employment but a decrease in wages of neighboring counties.
2.3 Methodology
Local labor markets may be influenced by state business cycles (Ewing et al., 2009;
Belasen and Polachek, 2008, 2009). Therefore, along with the exogenous tornado
shock the state’s labor market variables should be accounted for. Along with coun-
ties that are directly struck by a tornado, there exists a possibility that neighboring
counties may experience some spill-over effects. Labor markets have a seasonal com-
ponent that should also be included in the equation. Therefore, the final labor market
equation can be described by the following function
Yi,t = f(Ys,t, T
D
i,t , T
N
i,j,t) (2.1)
where, Yi,t is a labor market outcome - employment or wages per worker. Ys,t is the
corresponding state’s labor market outcome that controls for the state’s business cy-
cle. The coefficients of TDi,t capture the direct effect of tornadoes, while the coefficients
of TNi,j,t capture the spill-over effect of tornadoes.
I use a generalized difference-in-difference technique to identify the average effect of
tornadoes on local labor markets. Like a standard difference-in-difference model, a
generalized difference-in-difference method not only allows one to compare affected
regions (treatment) to unaffected regions (control), but also allows for multiple ex-
ogenous events occurring at different times. Hence, the equation I estimate is as
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follows
Yi,t = α0 +
P∑
p=1
αpYi,t−p +
Q∑
q=0
βqYs,t−q +
−2∑
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(δDk T
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k .1(
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j 6=i
TNi,j,t−k > 0))
+
k∑
k=0
(φDk T
D
i,t−k + φ
N
k .1(
∑
j 6=i
TNi,j,t−k > 0)) + λi + γt + εit
(2.2)
In the above equation TDi,t−k takes the value one if county i experiences a tornado
at time t. TNi,j,t−k takes the value one when a border sharing neighbor j of county i
experiences a tornado in time t. The lags of the tornado inform us of the effects of
tornadoes over time. Belasen and Polachek (2009) explain that historically destruc-
tion from hurricanes is repaired within two years. Compared to hurricanes, tornadoes
are more focused in nature. I therefore assume that the repair duration post-tornado
is no larger than hurricanes and include eight lags in my analysis. I find that the
results are robust to the inclusion of more lags. I report the estimates with 20 lags
(5 years) in the appendix. Including the same number of leads of the tornado as the
lags allows me to test for pre-treatment trends. I exclude the period just before the
tornado as the base period.
The series for employment and wages can be non-stationary for some panels. If this
is the case for counties as well as for states, it gives rise to the problem of spurious
regression. To resolve this, I include lags of the counties labor market outcome as
well as lags of the corresponding states labor market outcomes. I select 8 lags of
the labor market outcomes on the right hand side of the estimation equation using
akaike information criterion and bayesian information criterion. To account for any
endogeneity between the county and state labor market outcomes, I remove county
i’s labor market outcome from the state’s labor market outcome. λi and γt account
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for county and year-quarter fixed effects respectively. I cluster the standard errors at
the county level to account for correlation between panels as well as serial correlation
within the panel6.
Belasen and Polachek (2008, 2009) use a similar generalized difference-in-difference
approach to examine the effect of hurricanes on local labor markets of counties in
Florida. Even though other techniques such as propensity score matching may also
be suitable approaches, using a generalized difference-in-difference approach considers
the effects of observed and unobserved characteristics.
2.4 Data
The data on tornadoes are obtained from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration’s (NOAA) Storm Events Database. These data include the start date, and
the F-scale or the EF-scale of the tornadoes. They also include number of deaths,
injuries, and damages (property and crop) caused by a tornado. The Fujita (F) Scale
is a scale classifying the damage that a tornado has caused. The F-Scale ranges from
F0 to F5, with an F5 tornado causing incredibly extensive damage. This scale was
replaced by the Enhanced Fujita (EF) Scale in 2007. The Enhanced Fujita scale is a
more precise and robust way of assessing damages caused by tornadoes. This scale
ranges from EF0 to EF5 with EF5 being the strongest tornado causing extensive
damages. The Storm Events database allows for a clear and exogenous identification
of counties that experienced a violent tornado based on their F/EF scale classifica-
tion. As both the F and EF scale are based on damages, there have been tornadoes
that have been ranked as F2/EF2 or lower in open areas that could have been classi-
fied as F2/EF2 or greater if they hit a sufficiently well-constructed area7. Since the
classification of tornadoes is a measure of the destruction that it caused, the results
6Wooldridge (2010) mentions that a robust variance estimator is valid in the presence of het-
eroskedasticity or serial correlation if T is small relative to N
7https://www.spc.noaa.gov/faq/tornado/
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of this study could be extended to other disasters, natural or man-made, that cause
destruction of a similar nature and magnitude.
Cavallo et al. (2013) find that only extremely large disasters have a significant impact
on output in the short and the long run. Boustan et al. (2017) find that out-migration
and housing prices are affected by severe disasters. Following this strain of literature,
I focus on violent tornadoes and define a violent tornado as a tornado that has been
ranked as either an F-4/EF-4 or F-5/EF-5. I define two tornado variables in my
dataset. One accounts for the direct component. This variable takes the value one
if the county experiences at least one F4/EF4 or F5/EF5 tornado in a quarter. If
a tornado crosses county lines, so long as the tornado ranking does not drop below
the threshold between counties the variable for directly affected county is one for
each of these counties. My second tornado variable accounts for a violent tornado
in a neighboring county. This variable takes the value one if a neighboring county
experiences at least one F4/EF4 or F5/EF5 tornado in a quarter.
The data for employment are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). These data include employment levels
by industry for counties at a monthly frequency and total wages by industry at a
quarterly frequency. The QCEW occasionally suppresses data to protect the identity
or identifiable information of cooperating employers. These observations have a non-
disclosure flag associated with them and the value recorded for them is 0. At the
more aggregate level of industry and geography, the non-disclosed employment levels
and wages are included in the reported values. However, for some counties, data
for a few monthly observations are not disclosed even at the all industry level. For
these observations, I linearly interpolate the employment levels and the total wages.
I aggregate the employment levels to their respective quarters to examine a more
complete story along with wages per worker. I begin this chapter by focusing on all
industries in the private sector. I also examine the labor market based on specific
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industrial sectors, specifically, construction; manufacturing; finance, insurance, and
real estate (FIRE); trade, transportation, and utility (TTU); services; mining; and
agriculture. I also evaluate the effect of a tornado on employment at a monthly level
to inspect the nuances of the changes in employment within a smaller time frame
from the time of the tornado. I use census region CPI data made available by BLS
to compute real wages.
My final data for all industries and counties consist of an unbalanced panel of 3,106
counties in the contiguous United States spanning from 1975q1 to 2016q4. Data for
each of the industrial sectors in all the 3,106 counties are not available. The number
of counties for each sector varies from 2,196 to 3,105 counties. Table 2.1 describes the
summary statistics by industrial sectors. This summary shows the pooled average
employment and wages per worker between 1975 and 2016. It shows that the largest
employment levels are observed in the services sector and the lowest are observed in
mining followed closely by agriculture. On the other hand, mining has the highest
wages per worker and services sector the lowest. Figure 2.2, shows the maps for
violent tornadoes that occurred between 1975 and 2016. This figure shows that, most
violent tornadoes affect the mid-western and eastern region of the United States. It
also shows that a large number of counties have experienced only one violent tornado,
although there are counties that have experienced several violent tornadoes as can be
seen in table 2.2. Table 2.2 also describes the total number of violent tornadoes that
have occurred between 1975 and 2016 in the contiguous United States. This shows
that there have been 574 violent tornadoes throughout the contiguous United States,
a number far greater than the number of violent hurricanes experienced. Between
the same period the United States experienced approximately 110 major hurricanes
that were classified as category 3, 4, or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale8. However, far
less research has been done on the aftereffects of these tornadoes.
8http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/E11.html
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Using United States Department of Agriculture’s Rural-Urban Continuum Codes, I
identify counties as urban or rural. These codes are updated every 10 years starting
with 1974. I define a county to be rural or urban based on its status during a period of
plus/minus 5 years from the census year. For instance, a county is defined to be rural
or urban between 1998 and 2008 based on its status in the 2003 rural urban continuum
codes. I use this to evaluate the heterogeneous effect of a tornado on the labor
markets in rural and urban counties. Table 2.3 reports the summary statistics for
rural and urban counties respectively. As would be expected, employment and wages
per worker in urban counties is higher than in rural counties. Table 2.2 describes
the total number of violent tornadoes that have occurred between 1975 and 2016 in
the contiguous United States by rural and urban counties. This table shows that the
number of violent tornadoes that occurred in rural counties far exceeds the number
that have occurred in urban counties. However, as a percent the occurrence is well-
balanced with 15% of rural counties and 15% of urban counties experiencing at least
one violent tornadoes.
A potential data concern is whether the labor market data collected around the time
of a tremendously extensive tornado is reliable. Garber et al. (2006) review the
quick adaptation measures adopted by BLS’s QCEW to account for data gathering
problems because of Hurricane Katrina. They conclude that despite the adjustments
in the estimation and imputation procedures to accommodate the situation, due to
the high level of non-response some uncertainty remains regarding the employment
and wages measured during that period. It is possible that there may be some
uncertainty in the measured employment and wages around the period of a violent
tornado, however the adjustments made by the QCEW ensures a relatively lower
uncertainty than what it could have otherwise been.
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2.5 The Effects of Violent Tornadoes on Local Labor Markets
Figure 2.3 plots the effect of violent tornadoes on employment and wages per worker.
The top panel plots the effects of a violent tornado in directly affected counties,
while the lower panel plots the effects in neighboring counties. These results show
that violent tornadoes have no significant effect on employment throughout the two-
year period on the directly affected county. On the other hand, wages per worker,
on average, experience a contemporaneous increase of 0.31% as compared to the
previous period. This increase in wages per worker is statistically significant at the
95% confidence level. The response of wages per worker seven quarters after the
tornado increases by 0.46%. This increase too is statistically significant at the 95%
confidence level. The increase in wages per worker is persistent eight quarters after
the tornado with an increase of 1.37% as evidenced from the multiplier effect9. This
higher multiplier effect is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
The results support the previous discussion of a fall in employment due to potential
out-migration, while businesses trying to fill the void created by an increase in out-
migration apply positive pressure on demand leading to mostly insignificant change
in employment and increased wages per worker. Looking through the lens of a stan-
dard labor supply – labor demand model provides intuition behind the movements of
the labor market. Initially labor supply may not change much as individuals prepare
for migration and demand experiences positive pressure due to recovery and recon-
struction efforts. This leads to an insignificant change in employment and a positive
change in wages per worker contemporaneously. In later quarters, labor supply ex-
periences less scarcity due to out-migration because of individuals leaving the area
as in-migration due to people seeking job opportunities created as a result of recon-
struction efforts is experienced in the directly affected county. This is evidenced by
9The multiplier effect is the sum of the lagged coefficients of the tornado variable. The confi-
dence intervals are computed by inverting the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the
coefficients is different from zero.
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the insignificant change in employment along with the interim period of insignificant
change in wages per worker as it adjusts to this movement in the labor supply and the
labor demand. Two years after the tornado, wage growth is persistently higher than
its pre-tornado rates. The higher wages per worker persist even 5 years later. The
multiplier effects show that wages per worker settle at an approximate 3.09% higher
level starting sixteen quarters after the tornado. The increase in wages per worker
observed here is in line with findings of Skidmore and Toya (2002) who find that
climatic disasters like tornadoes, cyclones, hurricanes, etc. lead to higher economic
growth.
Belasen and Polachek (2009) find that hurricanes have an opposing effect on employ-
ment growth and wage growth. They find that the direct effect of a hurricane on
growth of earning is higher and lasts through the seventh quarter after the hurri-
cane. I find that the effects of a tornado on wages per worker are felt eight quarters
after the tornado. They also find a significant persistent decrease in employment
growth rate in the directly affected counties two years after the hurricane indicating
a stronger influence of labor supply and potentially migration. On the other hand,
I find that employment remains mostly unchanged throughout the two-year period
after the tornado, though wages per worker increase and remain persistently higher
two years after the tornado. The difference in findings could be attributed to the
difference in disasters or a difference in geography. Examining the data for the same
period as Belasen and Polachek (2009), I find that the post-tornado path of employ-
ment and wages per worker are similar to my entire sample, although the effects
are subdued and insignificant. The estimate of employment in the contemporaneous
period is negative, though insignificant. The estimate using the entire sample is also
negative and insignificant. This would suggest that the differences in the response of
employment that is observed may be due to the difference in the two disaster types.
Compared to hurricanes, tornadoes are more focused in nature and for the most part
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they are not accompanied by the additional damage caused by floods. There also
exists a possibility that the differences may be a result of geography. However, since
there are no violent tornadoes in Florida in my sample, testing that is not feasible.
Employment in neighboring counties experiences a rise of 0.34% and 0.31% four and
seven quarters after the tornado respectively. These increases are statistically sig-
nificant at the 90% confidence levels. However, the results also show a statistically
significant fall in employment of 0.8% three quarters before the tornado suggesting
there exists some uncertainty in the estimated response, though the joint significance
test of the coefficients reveals that the effect is jointly statistically insignificant. Wages
per worker, on the other hand, experience no significant change for most of the quar-
ters after the tornado. Although, seven quarters after the tornado wages per worker
fall by 0.3%, this fall is marginally significant at the 90% confidence level. Since the
data being evaluated accounts for the employment in the county and not the populace
of the county that is employed, there may be some spill-over labor supply available to
the neighboring counties due to potential in-migration of people seeking job opportu-
nities created as a result of reconstruction efforts in the neighboring tornado struck
county.
Violent tornadoes apply opposing forces to labor supply and labor demand as at-
tested by the persistently higher wages per worker and the insignificant change in
employment post-tornado in the directly affected counties. These results suggest a
better than the pre-tornado labor market outcome for these counties in the wake of
the tornado. Neighboring counties experience some spillover effects several quarters
after the tornado when they exhibit a rise in employment and a fall in wages per
worker suggesting labor supply spillover.
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2.5.1 Urban Vs. Rural
Demographics and income levels vary between urban and rural counties 10. As de-
scribed by the summary statistics in table 2.3, employment and wages per worker
between these types of counties also differ. For this reason, it should be expected
that the response of the labor market would vary between urban and rural counties.
Figure 2.4 shows the multiplier effect of a violent tornado on employment and wages
per worker in directly affected counties by urban and rural counties.11 These graphs
show that the average effects on directly affected counties that we observe across the
country are driven by the effects of violent tornadoes in rural counties. On average,
15% of both urban and rural counties have experienced at least one violent tornado
between 1975 and 2016. This implies that the results are not driven by the greater
number of tornadoes striking rural counties.
The effect of a violent tornado on employment in directly affected urban counties is
insignificant for the two-year period after the tornado that we observe here. How-
ever, employment experiences a marginally significant multiplier effect starting three
quarters after the tornado which persists eight quarters later. The multiplier effect
shows a marginally significant rise of 0.98% in employment three quarters after the
tornado. This increase continues to increase gradually to 1.43% eight quarters after
the tornado. This increase in the multiplier effect of employment almost a year after
the tornado suggests that reconstruction takes place more gradually than expected.
Wages per worker in the directly affected urban county experience no significant
change until eight quarters after the tornado. Wages per worker eight quarters after
the tornado are 0.5% higher than the quarter prior to the tornado. This increase in
wages per worker is only marginally significant. Although the pre-trend period shows
10https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-210.html
11The multiplier effect is the sum of the lagged coefficients of the tornado variable. The confi-
dence intervals are computed by inverting the Wald test of the null hypothesis that the sum of the
coefficients is different from zero.
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an increase in wages per worker seven quarters prior to the tornado suggesting some
uncertainty in the estimation, testing for joint significance shows that the period-by-
period effects are jointly insignificant. Examining the multiplier effect on wages per
worker for a longer duration (20 quarters) reveals that wages per worker in directly
affected urban counties are 4.24% higher ten quarters after the tornado and it con-
tinues to steadily increase to 5.04% twenty quarters after the tornado. This suggests
that over-time the in-migration of individuals experienced due to possible job oppor-
tunities may be moving on to greener pastures before complete recovery is achieved.
The higher wages in later quarters could also be an indication that reconstruction led
to technological upgrades that led to eventual higher wages.
Rural counties that are directly struck by a violent tornado experience no significant
change in employment as shown by figure 2.4. Wages per worker, on the other hand,
contemporaneously, as well as a quarter after the tornado, experience a statistically
significant increase of 0.3% and 0.4%, respectively, at the 90% confidence level. In
the following quarters the change in wages per worker is not significantly different
from the quarter prior to the tornado until seven quarters after the tornado when
wages per worker are 0.4% higher. Although three quarters prior to the tornado
wages per worker experience a rise of 0.4% with a significance of 10%, testing for
joint significance shows that the coefficients are not jointly significant. Even though
the interim quarters show insignificant change in wages per worker post-tornado,
the multiplier effect shown in the figure divulge that wages per worker are steadily
increasing throughout the two-year period after the tornado. After eight quarters
the multiplier effect shows wages per worker are higher by 1.79% at 95% confidence
level. This suggests that even though each quarter doesn’t see any strong effects to
the labor markets, there is a silver lining to the tornado in the directly affected rural
county in the form of cumulatively rising wages per worker. Reviewing estimates
for a longer duration reveals that wages per worker continues to increase steadily to
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about 2.5% twelve quarters after the tornado. Beyond the twelve quarters wages per
worker settle at the 2.5% higher level.
Many rural towns and villages have experienced a loss in easy access to necessities
like food and clothing and other goods as local businesses close resulting in residents
traveling a greater distance to obtain these goods and services (Glasgow 2000). This
implies that the sudden increase in demand of these goods and services would be
observed in the labor market as well. The difference in responses between urban
and rural counties could potentially be because rural counties may need to provide
incentive to fill the void created by out-migration as well as the demand created by
reconstruction and recovery. This would explain the persistently higher wages per
worker that are observed. On the other hand, since urban counties face no such lack
in access to resources including access to labor, an increase in demands for goods and
services to meet recovery efforts do not translate into a change in wages per worker
but they do translate to higher employment levels.
Figure 2.5 plots the multiplier neighboring effect of violent tornadoes on employment
and wages per worker by urban and rural counties. Urban neighboring counties
experience a marginally significant fall in employment of 0.4% five quarters after
the tornado. This decline in employment is observed only in that one quarter and
is suggestive of some out-migration of labor that may have resided in the directly
affected county but worked in the neighboring urban county. Wages per worker, on
the other hand, experience a significant increase of 0.59% four quarters after the
event. This rise is statistically significant at 95% confidence. Wages per workers
consequently experience a marginally significant fall of 0.7% seven quarters after the
tornado. However, wages per worker also experience an increase eight quarters prior
to the tornado, though the pre-tornado coefficients are jointly insignificant. These
responses suggest that the spill-over effects of a tornado are felt through employment
in the urban neighboring county, although this effect is only felt in that one quarter.
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The response of employment in rural neighboring counties to the tornado show an
increase in employment of 0.5% and 0.4% four and seven quarters after the tornado.
These increases are significant at the 95% confidence. The estimates also reveal a
fall in employment of 1.01% three quarters prior to the tornado, suggesting the effect
that we observe may lack precision although, the pre-tornado coefficients are jointly
insignificant. Wages per worker in the neighboring rural county also show that there
are no significant effects of the tornado. The results suggest that there may be no
significant spill-over effects of tornadoes on the labor market of rural neighboring
counties.
The response of directly affected urban and rural counties to a violent tornado shows
that the response of wages per worker that we observe for the entire sample are also
observed in rural counties. However, urban counties on the other hand, experience
persistently higher employment. This difference in response between urban and rural
counties may be a result of rural counties having to provide stronger incentive to
attract the labor that they need to meet the demands of reconstruction. The neigh-
boring effects on urban and rural counties vary as well. Neighboring urban counties
experience a fall in employment while neighboring rural counties experience no sig-
nificant effects. This difference in response in urban and rural neighboring counties is
potentially due to the possibility that people moving away from the affected county
worked in the neighboring urban county leading to a decline in employment in these
counties. An eventual increase in wages per worker suggesting that the demand for
labor due to reconstruction may also spillover into the neighboring urban county.
2.5.2 Time Disaggregation
Figure 2.6 shows the monthly effect of violent tornadoes on employment. This gives
a more detailed view of the response of employment to a violent tornado. I include
24 lags of the dependent variable as well as the corresponding state’s labor market
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outcome in the estimation model to account for the same time duration as in the
quarterly analysis. The figure shows that employment in the directly affected county
experiences a marginally significant increase of 0.35% two months after the tornado.
A significant increase in employment is observed in various months following the
tornado. Although, like the quarterly frequency, the multiplier effect of monthly em-
ployment displays no lasting effects. The figure shows a 0.24% and 0.30% increase
in employment four and seven months after the tornado. These increases are signif-
icant at the 95% confidence level. Month nine, eighteen, and twenty also show an
increase in employment of 0.19%, 0.2%, and 0.23% respectively. These short-lived
increases in employment suggest adjustment in labor supply and labor demand. How-
ever, whether the movement is in labor supply or labor demand is ambiguous since
the corresponding data for monthly wages per worker are unavailable. Although,
based on the higher wages per worker contemporaneously along with the persistently
higher wages per worker two years after the tornado it may be the case that the
short lived increase in employment is a result of changing labor supply due to in- and
out-migration. However, these nuances are not observed in the quarterly data.
On the other hand, when examining the neighboring effects of a violent tornado
the monthly response of employment shows a marginally significant fall of 0.24%
contemporaneously. This initial decline in employment is followed by declines of
0.2% and 0.27% six and seven months after the tornado respectively. Although we
also observe significant change in employment prior to the tornado which suggests
that the estimates lack precision, the pre and post-tornado coefficients are jointly
insignificant.
Examining monthly employment data reveals that there are months that experience a
positive significant change in employment. This indicates that there are employment
effects in the very short run that disappear so quickly that they cannot be observed
in the quarterly data. Hence it is beneficial to examine the monthly changes in
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employment in the aftermath of the tornado.
2.5.3 Does the Intensity of Tornado Matter?
Figure 2.7 plots the effects of a broader range of tornadoes on employment and wages
per worker. The variable Large Tornado takes the value one if county i is struck by at
least one tornado in time t that is ranked F2/EF2 or higher. There have been 7,908
tornadoes ranked F2/EF2 or higher between 1975 and 2016. Of these 2,625 tornadoes
have occurred in urban counties while 5,283 have been in rural counties. The figure
shows that large tornadoes have no significant effect on employment of the directly
affected county. On the other hand, wages per worker in the directly tornado struck
county fall by 0.1% contemporaneously as well as two quarters after the tornado.
This fall in wages per worker is statistically significant at 95% confidence. This effect
is observed in the contemporaneous quarter alone. The contemporaneous response
of wages per worker to a large tornado varies from that of its response to a violent
tornado. The wages per worker in the directly affected county are higher in the quarter
of a violent tornado. This fall in wages per worker due to large tornadoes can largely
be attributed to tornadoes ranked as F2/EF2 or F3/EF3. Since the destruction
caused by a F2/EF2 or F3/EF3 classified tornado is far less than a F4/EF4 or F5/EF5
classified tornado, aid and reconstruction and recovery efforts initiated are less for
these tornadoes. Hence, on net, the destruction could lead to lower wages per worker.
Even though direct effects display some difference when the intensity of tornadoes
is lowered, the neighboring effects show insignificant response of employment, while
wages per worker experience a 0.1% increase two quarters after the tornado. The
figure shows that the effect of a large tornado on the labor market of a neighboring
county is insignificant.
The direct and the neighboring effects to a large tornado suggests that the intensity
of the tornado does indeed matters. In corroboration with studies by Cavallo et al.
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(2013) and Boustan et al. (2017) who find that only extremely large disasters have a
significant impact on economic activity, these results indicate that it is the extreme
tornadoes that cause a strong response in the local labor markets.
2.5.4 Sector Disaggregation
Examining labor market response by specific sectors can reveal the industries that ex-
perience change after a devastating tornado. This uncovers the demands and needs of
the county in the aftermath of the tornado. This could potentially aid in establishing
policies that strengthen disaster management in particular sectors of the economy.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 plot the effect of a violent tornado on employment and wages per
worker respectively in directly affected counties by industrial sectors - construction;
manufacturing; finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE); trade, transportation,
and utility (hereafter TTU); services; mining; and agriculture. The results show that
only the construction sector experiences a change in employment as well as wages per
worker after the tornado in the tornado struck county. The FIRE sector experiences
some changes in its employment post-tornado in the directly affected county. The
remaining sectors experience some significant change prior to the tornado indicating
a lack of precision in the estimation of these sectors.
The construction sector experiences significant increase of 2.02% a quarter after the
tornado. This increase is significant at the 99% confidence level. Examining the
multiplier effect reveals that higher employment levels persist from a quarter after
the tornado to seven quarters after the tornado when the multiplier employment
level is 4.5% higher. The effect on wages per worker in the construction sector are
also observed a quarter after the tornado. Wages per worker in the construction
sector are 0.99% higher a quarter after the tornado. This increase is significant at
90% confidence. However, wages per worker also experience a marginally significant
decline two quarters prior to the tornado. Although, examining the multiplier effect
26
shows higher wages per worker of 1.5% a quarter after the tornado and 2.16% higher
three quarters later suggesting that there may be some increase in wages per worker
in the construction sector. The increase in employment and wages per worker is
likely due to the start of recovery and reconstruction. This suggests a more dominant
increase in labor demand in the construction sector.
The FIRE sector experiences significant increase of 0.5% in employment three quarters
after the tornado. This increase is statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
Examining the multiplier effect reveals that employment is steadily increasing from
1.03% three quarters after the tornado until at least eight quarters after the tornado
when the multiplier effect reveals that the effect is 1.67% higher. The multiplier
effects are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. Wages per worker of
the FIRE sector are lower by 0.5% at the 90% confidence level four quarters after
the tornado. Although the multiplier effect is statistically insignificant throughout
the eight-quarter period. The persistently higher employment in the FIRE sector
suggests that the sector experiences greater activity in the aftermath of the tornado.
Belasen and Polachek (2008) find that hurricanes result in a fall in growth in earnings
of the FIRE sector which is in-line with my findings. However, they also find that the
decline in growth in earnings is accompanied by an insignificant change in employ-
ment growth. Their results for the construction sector show that growth in earnings
increases while growth in employment remains unchanged. Their results suggest a
stronger demand shock is at play in these sectors in the aftermath of the tornado. I
find the same to be true in case of the construction sector, although for the FIRE
sector that may not be the case. These differences in findings could be a result of the
difference between hurricanes and tornadoes or even the fact that my analysis focuses
on the changes observed over time while they focus on the contemporaneous period.
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 plot the effects of a violent tornado on employment and wages
per worker respectively in a neighboring county by industrial sectors. The results
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show that employment in each of the sectors experience no significant change in a
neighboring county. Wages per worker in the FIRE sector experience some spillover
effects. The FIRE sector experiences higher wages per worker of 0.68% contempora-
neously. In the following quarters wages per worker in the FIRE sector experience
no significant change. This suggests that the neighboring counties experience some
spillover demand in the FIRE sector that translates to higher wages in the contem-
poraneous quarter. This additional demand in the FIRE sector may be a result of
disaster insurance claims.
The results illustrate that construction and FIRE sector experience increased activity
in the directly affected county in the aftermath of the tornado. Construction sector
experiences an increase in employment and wages a quarter after the tornado, while
FIRE sector experiences higher employment three quarters after the tornado and the
multiplier effect show that the effect is persistent. This indicates increased activity
in both these sectors, while the other sectors experience very short lived or no sig-
nificant effect from the tornado. The spillover effect felt in a neighboring county is
concentrated in the FIRE sector in the contemporaneous period in the form of higher
wages per worker.
2.6 Robustness Check
A concern with examining tornadoes is that they predominantly occur in the mid-
west and the southern regions of the U.S. The vast majority of violent tornadoes in
my sample occur in the mid-west and the Southern region of the country. To ensure
the robustness of the main results presented above, I estimate the above with data
from these regions alone. Figure A.4 illustrates these results. They show that the
average effects observed on the labor market indicators for the smaller sample of mid-
west and southern regions are the same as that observed for the complete sample that
covers the entire country. The period-to-period change in employment and wages per
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worker in the directly affected counties and the neighboring counties shows that it
follows a similar path as the main results.
Next I include an indicator term in the estimating equation that takes the value one
if in one of the previous twenty quarters the county has had a violent tornado. This
variable controls for any effect from a previous tornado. I also include a similar indi-
cator term to control for a neighboring county having experienced a violent tornado
in the past 20 quarters. The estimates are plotted in figure A.5. These results also
support the main results reported in the previous section.
Lastly, I re-estimate the effects of tornadoes on labor market outcomes using local
projection method. Although local projection method does not account for the effects
of previous tornadoes on labor market outcomes, the method provides an alternate
method to plot impulse response function without the restriction of VARs. They are
also more robust to misspecifications. Figure A.6 plots the estimates derived using
local projection. These results show that the effect of tornadoes on employment
of a directly affected county, like the main results is insignificant for most of the
horizon being examined, except for two quarters after the tornado when employment
is significantly higher. The results show that wages per worker in the aftermath of
the tornado for eight quarters follows a similar path as shown by the main results. In
neighboring counties the path followed by wages per worker is similar to that observed
in the main results, however there are some differences in the response of employment.
The graph shows that the adjustments experienced by employment due to ebb and
flow of labor supply and labor demand, unlike the main results, are significant in
several quarters. These results suggest a far stronger adjustment of labor supply and
demand due to in- and out-migration than the main results.
Predominantly the robustness checks suggest that the effect of violent tornadoes on
labor market outcomes are robust and not sensitive to the originally defined specifi-
cation.
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2.7 Key Findings
Violent tornadoes in directly affected counties result in opposing effects on labor
supply and labor demand. This is evident from the persistently higher wages per
worker and insignificant change in employment two years after the event. These
results suggest that the state of the labor market two years after the tornado is better
than its pre-tornado state due to persistently higher wages per worker. These results
are in line with the positive effect on growth deduced by Skidmore and Toya (2001).
Disaggregation of the sample between urban and rural counties shows that this change
in wages per worker is stronger in rural counties while they experience insignificant
change in employment. On the other hand, directly affected urban counties experience
persistently higher employment three quarter onwards and no significant change in
wages per worker. This difference in response between urban and rural counties can
be attributed to the possibility that rural counties may have to offer more incentive
to attract the needed labor supply to meet the demands of reconstruction resulting
in higher wages while urban counties require no such incentive.
Neighboring counties after a violent tornado experiences a quarter of lower wages per
worker five quarters after the tornado indicating that the labor market experiences a
brief period of labor supply excess. Examining the data separately for urban and rural
counties reveals that neighboring urban counties experience a decline in employment
five quarters after the tornado. This fall in employment in the urban neighboring
counties suggest a decline in the labor supply due to net out-migration or a decline
in labor demand due to lower consumption in the directly affected county. This also
implies a worse labor market outcome for a brief period following the tornado in the
neighboring urban county due to lower employment.
Lowering the threshold of the tornadoes to F2/EF2 and higher reveals that the coun-
ties directly affected experience lower wages per worker contemporaneously while em-
ployment remains unchanged. This effect on wages per worker is not felt beyond the
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contemporaneous quarter. Counties struck by violent tornadoes on the other hand,
experience persistently higher wages per worker two years after the event. This dif-
ference raises the question whether lower intensity tornadoes lead to lower aid and
reconstruction efforts which fall short of meeting the needs of the local economy. Al-
though the brevity of the response suggests that the shortfall is not felt beyond that
one quarter.
Examining the labor markets by industrial sectors reveals that the construction sec-
tor experiences higher labor demand a quarter after the tornado as suggested by
the higher employment and wages per worker. These higher levels are persistent for
employment until seven quarters after the tornado, however that is not the case for
wages per worker. The increased employment and one quarter of increased wages
per worker are indicative of demand generated due to reconstruction and recovery
efforts. FIRE sector reveals that employment experiences a persistent increase start-
ing three quarter after the tornado. Employment in the FIRE sector continues to
steadily increase and is persistently higher eight quarters after the tornado. This
suggests higher demand for FIRE sector services potentially due to insurance claims
and increases in other financial activities in the aftermath of the tornado.
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2.8 Tables
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Table 2.1: Quarterly Summary Statistics
All Construction Manufacturing FIRE TTU Services Mining Agriculture
Employment 29,695 1,703 5,462 2,134 7,109 11,473 381 391
(115,249) (5,988) (20,343) (11,588) (27,304) (51,061) (1,905) (2,103)
State Employment 2,488,258 148,440 444,894 173,541 594,438 970,199 38,417 29,057
(2,300,202) (146,117) (383,459) (177,665) (539,313) (1,044,107) (66,003) (66,463)
Wages per worker ($) 3,615 4,111 4,491 4,253 3,055 2,743 6,911 3,281
(933) (4,203) (3,297) (8,465) (817) (983) (33,118) (7,642)
States Wages per worker ($) 4,517 5,214 5,651 5,781 4,048 3,905 8,360 3,796
(1,179) (14,464) (21,749) (6,436) (653) (781) (164,846) (138,975)
Observations 520,034 515,261 503,316 509,781 519,173 518,781 311,714 456,650
Counties 3,106 3,099 3,052 3,081 3,105 3,105 2,196 3,048
Note: The table reports the pooled average of the variables for an unbalanced panel of counties spanning from 1975 to 2016.The standard deviations are reported
in parenthesis.
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Table 2.2: Number of Tornadoes
All Counties Urban Counties Rural Counties
Violent Tornado (EF4 and EF5) 574 193 381
Counties with 1 Violent Tornado 340 111 235
Counties with 2 Violent Tornadoes 73 20 50
Counties with 3 Violent Tornadoes 21 10 11
Counties with 4 Violent Tornadoes 5 3 2
Counties with 5 Violent Tornadoes 1 0 1
No. of Counties 3106 1237 2522
Note: The table reports the total number of counties that have experienced an EF4 and EF5 tornado
between 1975 to 2016. It also lists the number of counties that have experienced 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 such
tornadoes between this period.
Table 2.3: Quarterly Summary Statistics for Urban and Rural Counties
Urban Counties Rural Counties
Employment 85,094 6,129
(200,036) (7,100)
Wages per worker 4,136 3,394
(980) (817)
Note: The table reports the pooled average of employment and
wages per worker by urban and rural counties spanning from 1975
to 2016.The standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: All Tornadoes Between 1975 and 2016
100+
81 to 100
61 to 80
41 to 60
21 to 40
1 to 20
No Tornaodoes
Note: The figure plots all the number of tornadoes that have occurred in each of the counties of the
United States between 1975 and 2016.
Figure 2.2: EF4 and EF5 (Violent) Tornadoes Between 1975 and 2016
5 Tornadoes
4 Tornadoes
3 Tornadoes
2 Tornadoes
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No Tornaodoes
Note: The figure plots the number of EF4 and EF5 tornadoes that have occurred in counties of the
United States between 1975 and 2016.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of Violent Tornadoes on Labor Market Outcomes (All Industries)
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Note: The solid line plots the response of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line plots
the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the direct effects and the lower panel plots
the neighboring effects
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Figure 2.4: Multiplier Effect of Violent Tornadoes on Labor Market Outcomes (All
Industries) of Directly Affected Urban and Rural Counties
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Note: The solid line plots the multiplier effect of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line
plots the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the effect on Urban counties and the
lower panel plots effects for Rural counties
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Figure 2.5: Multiplier Effect of Violent Tornadoes on Labor Market Outcomes (All
Industries) of Neighboring Urban and Rural counties
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Note: The solid line plots the multiplier effect of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line
plots the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the effect on Urban counties and the
lower panel plots effects for Rural counties
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Figure 2.6: Effect of Violent Tornadoes on Employment (Monthly)
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Note: The solid line plots the monthly response of employment. The dotted line plots the 90%
confidence interval.
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Figure 2.7: Effect of Large Tornadoes on Labor Market Outcomes (All Industries)
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Note: The solid line plots the response of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line plots
the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the direct effect and the lower panel plots
neighboring effects. Large tornadoes are defined as the tornadoes that are classified as EF2 or higher.
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Figure 2.8: Effect of Violent Tornado on Employment in Directly Affected Counties
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Note: The solid line plots the response of employment. The dotted line plots the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 2.9: Effect of Violent Tornado on Wages per Worker in Directly Affected Counties
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Note: The solid line plots the response of wages per worker. The dotted line plots the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 2.10: Effect of Violent Tornado on Employment in Neighboring Counties
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Note: The solid line plots the response of employment. The dotted line plots the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 2.11: Effect of Violent Tornado on Wages per Worker in Neighboring Counties
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Note: The solid line plots the response of wages per worker. The dotted line plots the 90% confidence interval.
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Chapter 3 The Long-Run Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist
Attacks
3.1 Introduction
Over the last several decades, infrequent disasters like terrorist attacks and natural
disasters have become an increasing concern for countries across the globe. Some
of these events have resulted in destruction of catastrophic proportions in terms of
human life as well as monetary value. For instance, the 2011 earthquake in Japan
resulted in 19,846 deaths, 368,820 people affected, and property damage of $210
million1. In contrast, terrorist attacks usually target a small region of a nation, but
they can have large consequences. For example, the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the U.S. led to 2,996 deaths and property loss of catastrophic proportion (likely
greater than $1 billion)2. Countries have since stepped up their efforts to reduce both
external and internal threats.
These events - terrorist attacks and natural disasters - are instances of arguably
exogenous negative shocks that can affect both human and physical capital. However,
the magnitude of the shock varies considerably. Despite this, several studies have
found similar negative effects on GDP growth. In this chapter, I use a common
conceptual framework of the Solow-Swan growth model, to examine the dynamics of
GDP growth in the aftermath of these different types of shocks. I also distinguish
between the different channels through which natural disasters and terrorist attacks
affect growth. I find that although natural disasters collectively lead to lower GDP
growth, this is not true for all types of natural disasters considered separately. I
find that the same is true for terrorist attacks. While terrorist attacks result in
1These values are from EM-DAT, the database for natural disasters)
2These values are from the Global terrorism database.
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insignificant changes in GDP growth, domestic terrorist attacks have a declining
effect on GDP growth. Examining the different channels through which each shock
affects GDP growth reveals some of the reasons behind the negative effects observed
despite the difference in magnitude of the shock. Most revealing of the channels is the
decomposed government expenditure. Terrorist attacks generally lead to increased
military spending, such as war efforts or defense spending to strengthen a nation’s
borders, and reconstruction spending. After a natural disaster, on the other hand,
the government’s response is usually focused on reconstruction efforts.
Previous studies have addressed the impact of transnational and domestic terrorism
on economic growth. Transnational terrorism results in a decline in GDP per capita
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Blomberg et al., 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler,
2008, 2009, 2011). While domestic terrorism has a negative effect on growth in
Western Europe (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008), it has no significant effect on growth
in Africa (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011). Thus studies have found heterogeneous
effects of the transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. Additionally, Gaibulloev
and Sandler (2011) suggest that transnational and domestic terrorist attacks affect
growth differently for various reasons. They argue that as the frequency of occurrence
of domestic terrorism exceeds that of transnational terrorist attacks it leads to a
perception of persistence. People and businesses accept domestic terrorism as part of
their daily routine. They contend that it is cheaper to counter domestic terrorism than
transnational terrorism since they do not require additional border security measures
nor do they require offensive operations in foreign countries. Studies focused on
transnational terrorism have found a negative effect of transnational terrorist attacks
on foreign direct investment (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; Enders and Sandler,
1996) which is an important source of savings for developing countries. Furthermore,
the threat of transnational terrorism may curb the inflow of foreign aid. Hence
following the example of previous studies, I distinguish between transnational and
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domestic terrorist attacks and find that there are some differences in the way that
growth and its components respond to these different types of terrorism.
On the other hand, literature is inconclusive on the response of GDP to natural
disasters. Albala-Bertrand (1993) and Skidmore and Toya (2002) find that disasters
have a positive impact on economic growth. In contrast, Noy and Nualsri (2007)
find a decline in output per capita due to a decline in human capital as a result of
disasters. Raddatz (2009) and Jaramillo (2009) also find support for Noy and Nualsri
(2007) using a different set of countries and different sample periods. Fomby et. al
(2013) find that droughts, earthquakes and storms result in a drop in GDP. However,
they find that floods have a positive effect on GDP, which may indicate the benefit
that floods may have on agricultural productivity. Several other studies also find that
natural disasters have a negative effect on growth (Cavallo et al., 2013; Hochrainer,
2009; Cuaresma et al., 2008; Hallegatte and Dumas, 2009).
Much of the research on terrorism focuses on the channels through which terrorism af-
fects short run economic growth. Studies show that terrorism gives rise to uncertainty
which in turn reduces investment and foreign direct investment (Abadie and Gardeaz-
abal, 2003, 2008; Enders and Sandler, 1996; Bandyopadhyay et. al, 2013). Another
channel through which terrorism affects growth is government spending. Terrorist
attacks cause governments to redirect spending towards security and away from more
growth-enhancing investments (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008). Terrorist attacks also
increase the cost of doing business because of larger insurance premiums and greater
security expenditures. Destroyed infrastructure leads to business disruption. For ex-
ample, the IRA attacks on London’s financial district at the Baltic Exchange on April
10, 1992 is estimated to have resulted in $800 million in lost business (Gaibulloev and
Sandler, 2009).
On the other hand, the literature on disasters focuses on financing reconstruction and
policy-making in their aftermath. Although there are means to predict the occurrence
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of a disaster, uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the loss, moral hazard, and
adverse selection lead to under-insurance. For instance, Hurricane Katrina resulted
in insurance claims of $46.3 billion while the estimated damage was $158.2 billion
(Kunreuther and Pauly, 2010). The problem of insuring against disasters is larger for
developing economies. They face market limitations and political resistance as well
as inadequate and inefficient institutions (Healy and Malhotra, 2009; Pettersen et.
al.,2005) along with resource constraints.
Studies have also focused on the differential effects of natural disasters on developing
and developed countries and find that the adverse effect on growth of developing
countries is much larger than on developed countries (Noy, 2009; Fomby et al. 2013).
Similar studies have also been done for transnational terrorism. Gaibulloev and San-
dler (2009) find that developed Asian countries absorb the effects of a transnational
terrorist attack, while developing Asian countries experience a declining effect in in-
come per capita growth. Following this vein of literature, I examine the growth effects
of terrorism and natural disasters on developing and emerging economies separately.
I find that developed and emerging economies are able to absorb the shock of transna-
tional and domestic terrorism, however, only developed economies are able to absorb
the shock of natural disasters. I also examine the channels through which growth is
affected for developed and emerging economies and find that the channels through
which different disasters affect GDP growth also varies.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
The basic Solow-Swan growth model helps in understanding how negative shocks
like natural disasters and terrorist attacks may affect GDP growth. Consider the
following Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing marginal returns and
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constant returns to scale.
Y = AKαL1−α (3.1)
Where Y is output, A is the level of technology or a general productivity parameter,
K is capital, L is labor, and α and (1− α) represent the factor shares of capital and
labor respectively.
The Solow model assumes that only capital is accumulated over time and a constant
fraction of the output is saved and invested as capital formation. The model also
assumes that labor experiences a fixed growth rate that is the same as the population
growth rate and the level of technology grows at an exogenous growth rate g. Hence,
∆K = sY − δK (3.2)
∆L = nL (3.3)
where s is the constant fraction of the output that is saved and invested as capital
formation, δ is the depreciation rate of the capital, and n is the population growth
rate. The next step is to identify the growth rate of capital and output in the
transition to the steady state. After converting the variables to per-worker and some
algebra, the growth rates of capital per worker and output per worker can be given
by
k˙ =
∆k
k
= s
y
k
− (δ + n+ g) (3.4)
y˙ =
∆y
y
= αk˙ (3.5)
The growth rate of output and capital go hand-in-hand. Therefore the growth rate
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of capital per worker and thus output per worker is given by the difference of sy and
(δ + n+ g)k.
Examining this model suggests that natural disasters and terrorist attacks may affect
growth through the following channels (1) the level of capital per worker and (2) the
destruction of labor. Natural disasters and terrorist attacks may destroy capital by
destroying railway lines, roads, dams, communication lines, etc. They also destroy
labor due to the deaths that they cause. Table 3.1 shows that on average the num-
ber of deaths caused by natural disasters is far greater than the deaths caused by
terrorist attacks. On average natural disasters result in 0.012 deaths per thousand
inhabitants of a country whereas terrorist attacks result in 0.001 deaths per thousand
inhabitants. The nature of natural disasters would suggest that they can also cause
huge destruction of capital. If a natural disaster destroys more capital than labor,
reducing k, the model suggests that the economy will experience a short period of
higher growth as the economy transitions back to its steady state. Although a coun-
try may experience higher growth in the short run, it is not “better off”. On the
other hand, if the number of deaths caused by a natural disaster exceeds the level of
capital destroyed, capital per worker in the economy will be greater than before and
the economy will experience a decline in growth. This suggests that the immediate
after effect on growth is ambiguous in the aftermath of natural disasters. Despite
terrorist attacks, on average, causing lower number of deaths and capital destruction
than natural disasters, their effect on growth too is ambiguous for the same reasons
as that of natural disasters. Additionally, if skilled or more productive labor leave
due to natural disasters or terrorist attacks, productivity would decline. This would
result in the marginal product of capital to decline for every level of capital per worker
resulting in a decline in growth.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data Description
The data on natural disasters were obtained from the Emergency Disaster Database
(EM-DAT) collected by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED) at the Universite´ Catholique de Louvain (UCL). This dataset has worldwide
coverage. It contains data on the occurrence of natural disasters, the number of fatali-
ties, the number affected, and the monetary damage that was inflicted by said natural
disaster. Disasters are recorded in the EM-DAT database when at least one of the
following criteria is fulfilled: (1) 10 or more people are reported killed; (2) 100 people
are reported affected; (3) a state of emergency is declared: and/or (4) international
assistance is called for. These disasters can be hydro-meteorological disasters that
include floods, wave surges, storms, droughts, landslides, and avalanches; geophysical
disasters that include earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions; or biological
disasters that include epidemics and insect infestations. This paper excludes disas-
ters that could have been prevented or cured by human intervention, and focuses on
three of the most commonly occurring hydro-meteorological and geophysical disasters
- floods, earthquakes, and storms. These events include the earthquake in Japan in
2011 as well as the earthquake in Indian Ocean in 2004. Although EM-DAT includes
the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the final dataset does not include this due to lack of
macroeconomic data for Haiti. The dataset classifies hurricanes primarily as storms.
Therefore, the final data includes hurricanes like Hurricane Katrina as a storm.
The U.S. Department of State (2003: xii) defines terrorism as ‘terrorism means
premeditated, politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience’. My
definition of terrorism closely follows this definition. I broadly define terrorism as the
use of violence and intimidation to gain political or social leverage. A key aspect of
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terrorism is that it usually circumvents democratic processes by threatening the citi-
zens of the target country. This would suggest that the objective behind the violence
goes beyond the victims of the incident. Another aspect of terrorism is that either
individuals or groups initiate the violence. The definition of terrorism includes state-
sponsored terrorism, but does not include incidents of a state employing violence
against its own citizens. That is, the state may provide assistance like safe-haven,
financing, or information, but does not itself employ violence.
The data on terrorism is from the Global Terrorist Database (GTD). This dataset
includes violent incidents that are initiated by individuals or groups to propagate a
political or religious goal. The dataset requires that two out of the following three
conditions be met for an incident to be classified as a terrorist attack: (1) the incident
must be aimed at achieving a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (2) it must
be intended to influence or be a message to individuals other than the direct victims;
and (3) it violated International Humanitarian Law.
Terrorism can be classified into two types: domestic terrorism and transnational ter-
rorism. Domestic terrorism is home grown and affects only the institutions, citizens,
property, and policies of the host country. The venue, target, and victims along with
the initiators of the incident are from the same country. For example, the series of
bombings across Mumbai, India on March 12, 1993 that killed 317 people and injured
1,250 is an example of a domestic terror attack. This incident was instigated by home
grown extremists in the wake of religious riots. Another example is the Oklahoma
City bombing on April 19, 1995 where the perpetrator, target and the victims of
this incident were all from the same country. This incident killed 168 people and
injured 650. Transnational terrorism concerns more than one country. International
skyjacking or the mailing of a letter bomb to another country involves more than
one country. An example of transnational terror attack is the shooting down of a
Russian airline in Egypt on October 31, 2015. GTD includes data on both domestic
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and transnational terrorist attacks. However, it does not distinguish between the
two. For this reason, I follow the steps outlined by Enders et. al (2011) to distinguish
between domestic and transnational terrorist attack. These steps are outlined in the
appendix.
The measure for natural disasters and terrorist attacks accounts for the accumulated
deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country in a given year. That is, if a country
has experienced multiple natural disasters in a given year, the measure accounts for
the sum of these deaths per thousand inhabitants of said country. It is also possible
that a country can experience the different types of natural disasters and terrorist
attacks in the same year, e.g., a domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism in
the same year or floods and an earthquake in the same year. The measure for these
separate types of natural disasters and terrorist attacks only takes into account the
deaths caused by these specific types of events. In my analysis I include events that
result in deaths that are greater than the 75th percentile of deaths caused by that
type of event throughout the world3. This definition is similar to the one used by
Cavallo et al. (2013), who use the 99th, 90th, and the 75th as their thresholds4. The
75th percentile cutoff can be quantified as a natural disaster that kills more than
0.002 people per thousand inhabitants of a country, and terrorist attacks that have
caused more than 0.0006 deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country. The cut
off for specific natural disasters and terrorist attacks are listed in Table 3.2. This
table clearly shows that there is a huge disparity in the magnitude of the destruction
(shock) caused by the different natural disasters and terrorist attacks. The incidents
accounted for in the final dataset include the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 as a
3I examine the assumption of non-linear response to deaths by estimating the results with all
deaths and their squared variable and find a convex relationship between number of deaths and
GDP growth. These results can be seen in table A.3 in the appendix. This suggests that it is events
that result in high number of deaths that have the strongest effect on GDP growth.
4I examine my data with the 99th and 90th percentile as the threshold and baring a few differences
the results are similar to that of the 75th percentile intensity. These estimations are described as
part of robustness checks
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domestic terrorist attack, as well as the Mumbai transnational terrorist attacks of
2008. They also include Hurricane Katrina in 2005, although Hurricane Sandy in
2012 is not included as the number of deaths caused by this storm falls short of the
threshold.
Table 3.3 lists the frequency of occurrence of instances of the different types of natu-
ral disasters that result in accumulated deaths greater than the 75th percentile of the
world pooled deaths due to a specific type of event that a country experiences in a
given year. The table shows that the instances of natural disasters that have occurred
in the dataset are equivalent to the instances of terrorist attacks, although there is
a disparity in the number of occurrence of each specific type of event. Examining
the table reveals that the most frequent natural disasters in the dataset are floods,
whereas the frequency of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks are comparable.
It is clear from the table that not all countries have experienced a large event. Among
the countries that have experienced instances of large transnational terrorist attacks,
countries like Israel and Ireland have experienced 26 and 18 instances respectively be-
tween 1970 and 2015, while countries like the United States, France, and Sweden have
experienced only one instance of a transnational terrorist attack of a similar magni-
tude between 1970 and 2015. There have also been transnational terrorist incidents
in countries like Australia, Brazil and Germany, but the incidents on collectively did
not yield a death toll greater than the threshold in any given year. The dataset also
consists of countries like Mauritius that have not experienced a transnational terrorist
attack between 1970 and 2015. For domestic terrorism too there are some countries
like the Philippines and Sri Lanka that experience 19 instances of large domestic ter-
rorist attacks, while countries like Austria and Switzerland experience only one year
where accumulated deaths by domestic terrorism exceeded the threshold. Although
countries like Portugal, Sweden, and Japan have experienced domestic terrorist at-
tacks between 1970 and 2015, none of the attacks resulted in casualties greater than
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the defined threshold. Additionally, United Kingdom and Mongolia are rare instances
of countries that have not experienced a domestic terrorist attack between 1970 and
2015 (The IRA attacks have been identified by the GTD database as either having in-
ternational ideologies or logistics and are therefore classified as transnational terrorist
attacks). Variation in the frequency of natural disasters also occurs across countries.
India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have experienced 13 or more instances where the
accumulated deaths due to floods exceeded the threshold, while countries like Italy
and Malaysia have only experienced one such instance. Countries like Netherlands
and France have experienced floods between 1970 and 2015, however these floods have
not caused fatalities to exceed the defined threshold. Countries like New Zealand and
Japan have experienced one instance where the accumulated deaths due to earth-
quake exceeds the cutoff, whereas Indonesia and Iran have experienced more than 11
such earthquakes. Despite regions of United States being prone to earthquakes, in
none of the years did the death toll due to earthquakes exceed the threshold. Storms
are concentrated between relatively few countries, with the Philippines experiencing
the maximum instances of storms that lead to higher than the cutoff deaths due to
storms in a given year, followed by Bangladesh. Countries like United Kingdom and
Kenya experienced one instance of higher than threshold accumulated deaths due
to storms. Whereas countries like Kuwait and Bahrain have experienced no storms
between 1970 and 2015.
The economic indicators - real GDP per capita, government expenditure as a share
of GDP, military expenditure as a share of GDP, gross fixed capital formation as
a share of GDP, trade as a share of GDP, and population - are from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). I identify non-military government
expenditure as a share of GDP as the part of government expenditure that is left after
subtracting military expenditures from it. Military expenditure is not available for all
of the countries and hence the analysis for the military and non-military expenditures
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comprises of fewer countries than the entire sample. Educational attainment is from
Barro and Lee (2013), and Polity 2 score is from the Polity IV dataset. The World
Bank Analytical Classification classifies countries based on income. Using this data,
I identify high income countries in 2015 as developed economies and the remaining
as emerging economies.
The resulting dataset consists of an unbalanced annual panel of 125 countries spanning
from 1970 to 2015. This sample includes 41 developed economies and 84 emerging
economies. Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of the economic indicators along
with the frequency of occurrence of different disasters. The table shows that average
annual GDP growth for all countries is 1.89 percent. The table also shows that the
emerging economies in the sample have been growing at a slower rate than devel-
oped economies. Capital formation and government expenditures as a share of GDP
does not vary much between developed and emerging economies. The table shows
that developed economies enjoy more trade openness than emerging economies. The
summary statistics show that, on average, fewer people per thousand inhabitants of
a country are killed due to transnational and domestic terrorist attacks as compared
to floods, earthquake, and storms. It also illustrates that on average, the number
of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country is greater in emerging economies
regardless of the type of incident.
3.4 Methodology
To determine the effect that these disasters have on the economic growth, I use a
standard growth regression equation.
∆ln(yit) = β0 + β1NDit + β2Terrorit +X
′
itδ + αi + λt + vit (3.6)
where, yit is the real GDP per capita for country i in year t. NDit, and Terrorit are
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the natural log of the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants that occurred due
to the events in country i in time t. Xit is the vector of controls and αi and λt are
the country and year fixed effects.
I include some determinants of GDP growth in the estimation equation as controls,
drawing from the vast growth literature (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003;
Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; among others). These are (1) the initial level of real
GDP per capita, (2) trade openness (real exports plus real imports over real GDP),
(3) investment, (4) government consumption, (6) population growth from WDI; (6)
educational attainment from Barro and Lee (2013); and (7) Polity 2 score (a measure
of democracy) from Polity IV dataset.
To examine the channels through which these destructive events affect GDP growth
I estimate the following equation:
Channelit = θ0 + θ1NDit + θ2Terrorit + γXit + αi + λt + εit (3.7)
where Channelit is the mechanism for country i in time t through which a destructive
event can affect GDP growth. I investigate investment share of GDP, military ex-
penditures as a share of GDP and non-military government expenditures as a share
of GDP as possible channels through which these events may affect GDP growth.
Xit is a vector of controls. Based on previous literature that has examined channels
through which growth may be affected such as Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008, 2009),
I use the same controls as in growth equation 3.6.
3.5 The Growth Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist attacks
Table 3.4 reports the estimation results of the effect of large natural disasters and
terrorist attacks on GDP growth using the full sample. The first three specifications
examine the different types of natural disasters and terrorist incidents when combined
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into two variables. The results from these specifications show that on average large
terrorist attacks lead to an insignificant change in GDP growth, while a one percent
increase in number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country due to a large
natural disaster leads to a marginally significant decrease of 0.02 percentage points
in GDP growth contemporaneously. This decline in GDP growth due to natural
disasters is also supported by the vast majority of disaster literature. This reduction
in GDP growth rate is also consistent with the short-run Solow model effects described
in the previous section.
The results in the fourth specification of Table 3.4 examines transnational terror-
ist attacks, domestic terrorist attacks, floods, earthquakes, and storms separately.
Although large terrorist attacks have no significant effect on GDP growth, when dis-
aggregated into transnational and domestic terrorist attacks, we observe a significant
decline in GDP growth in the aftermath of large domestic terrorist attacks. While the
decline in GDP growth in the wake of a transnational terrorist attack is not statisti-
cally significant, the decline is not different from the statistically significant decline
in GDP growth due to domestic terrorist attacks. The results show that a one per-
cent increase in the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country due to
domestic terrorism leads to a marginally significant decline of 0.30 percentage points
in GDP growth in the year of the attack. Although these results are consistent with
findings of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) who find that domestic terrorism adversely
affect GDP growth in Western Europe, they are at odds with findings of Gaibulloev
and Sandler (2011) who show that domestic terrorism has an insignificant effect on
GDP growth in Africa. The difference in results can be attributed to a difference in
the sample and sample period or in the controls included in the analysis. Although I
find no significant effect of transnational terrorism on GDP growth, Gaibulloev and
Sandler (2009, 2011) find that transnational terrorist attacks have a negative effect
on GDP growth in Asia as well as in Africa. The difference in results could be a
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due to sample period, geography, or even the control variables included in the model.
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) focus only on Asia from 1970 to 2004, while Gaibulloev
and Sandler (2011) examine countries in Africa from 1970 to 2007.
The response of GDP growth to floods, earthquakes, and storms shows that large
floods and storms negatively affect GDP growth, while large earthquakes lead to
no significant change in growth. A one percent increase in the number of deaths
per thousand inhabitants of a country due to large floods lead to a 0.14 percentage
points decline in GDP growth in the contemporaneous year. This decline in growth
is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. A one percent increase in the
deaths per thousand inhabitants due to a large storm leads to a smaller decline of
0.03 percentage points in GDP growth in the year of the large storm, although the
decline is as statistically significant as the decline from floods. These results vary
from findings of Loayza et al. (2009) and Fomby et al. (2013), who find that floods
positively affect growth, while the effect of storms is insignificant. They too find that
earthquakes have no significant effect on GDP growth. In the framework of the Solow
model, these results suggest that floods and storms cause considerable destruction of
capital, since the nature of floods and storms suggest far more capital to be destroyed
than deaths.
Investigating the channels through which these events may affect GDP growth by
estimating equation 3.7 provides a framework to examine how the economy is affected
by these different incidents. Tables 3.5 to 3.7 report these estimates. Table 3.5
presents the results of the estimated effects of large natural disasters and terrorist
attacks on investment. These results show that investment as a share of GDP does
not experience a significant change due to either natural disasters or terrorist attacks
examined here. This would suggest that the effect of natural disasters and terrorist
attacks on GDP growth through private and public capital is weak at best.
Table 3.6 presents the response of military expenditure to large natural disasters and
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terrorist attacks. The results show that on average a one percent increase in the
number of people killed per thousand inhabitants of a country due to a large terrorist
attack increases military expenditures as a share of GDP contemporaneously by 4.54
percent. This increase is significant at the 95% confidence level. Evaluating disag-
gregated terrorism shows that the increase in military expenditures is mainly due to
domestic terrorist attacks. A one percent increase in deaths per thousand inhabitants
due to domestic terrorism leads to a 5.97 percent increase in military expenditures
as a share of GDP in the year of the attack. The increase in military expenditures
suggests that countries attempt to increase safety measures for its citizens in the wake
of domestic terrorist attacks. Additionally, increased security measures may act as a
signal to businesses that they may not incur as high a cost of doing business in the
affected country as they previously believed. Transnational terrorism also increases
military expenditures, however this increase is not statistically significant. although
the increase in military spending due to transnational terrorism is not significantly
different from the increase due to domestic terrorism. This suggests that countries do
focus on security even in the wake of transnational terrorism. The table also shows
that on average natural disasters do not significantly change military expenditure as
a share of GDP.
Table 3.7 reports the response of non-military expenditures to large natural disasters
and terrorist attacks. The estimations in this table show that large natural disasters
and terrorist attacks do not significantly affect non-military expenditures. However,
examining the disaggregated response to natural disasters shows that in the aftermath
of floods non-military expenditures increase. A one percent increase in the number
of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country results in a 0.19 percent increase in
non-military expenditures as a share of GDP in the contemporaneous year. In the
previously conceptualized framework, this result suggests that floods cause destruc-
tion of capital in the form of destroyed roads, railways, power lines, etc. Increased
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non-military government expenditures suggest that resources are being utilized to fix
the disrupted flow of these services.
On average, large natural disasters lead to a decline in GDP growth, while large ter-
rorist attacks lead to no significant change. Examining natural disasters and terrorist
attacks by type reveals the disparity among these events. I find that although terror-
ist attacks overall do not decrease GDP growth, domestic terrorism leads to a decline
in GDP growth. A channel through which this decline in GDP growth is experienced
is increased military expenditures. Among natural disasters, I find that it is floods
and storms that reduce GDP growth. It is evident that floods increase non-military
government expenditures as infrastructure services are repaired in the aftermath of
floods. Domestic terrorist attacks increase military expenditures at the expense of
non-military expenses to increase security.
3.5.1 Developed Vs. Emerging Economies
Developed economies are more diversified, have better infrastructure and may also
have resources dedicated towards disasters, while emerging economies are more re-
source constrained. For this reason, developed and emerging economies may respond
to negative shocks differently. Examining the effects of the different types of terror-
ism and natural disasters on GDP growth and the channels through which they affect
growth separately for developed and emerging economies could provide a clearer pic-
ture of the response to be expected. I define countries that are classified as high
income in 2015 as developed and the remaining countries as emerging.
Table 3.8 reports the effect of each type of terrorist attack and natural disasters on
GDP growth for developed and emerging economies. The results show that despite
the marginal negative effect of domestic terrorism on GDP growth for the full sample,
both transnational terrorism and domestic terrorism have no significant effect on GDP
growth in either developed or emerging economies. This would suggest that both
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developed and emerging economies have learned to cope with terrorist attacks. The
results also reveal that aggregated natural disasters have no significant effect on GDP
growth of developed and emerging economies. However, examining specific disasters
shows that while developed economies are indeed better able to absorb the shock of
floods, earthquakes, and storms, emerging economies are not as successful. Emerging
economies experience a decline in GDP growth due to floods as well as storms. The
results indicate that a one percent increase in the number of deaths per thousand
inhabitants of a country due to floods leads to a 0.13 percentage points decline in
GDP growth, while an increase in the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of
a country due to storms leads to a 0.03 percentage points decline in GDP growth of
emerging economies contemporaneously.
Similar to the difference in the response of GDP growth in developed and emerging
economies to these disasters, the channels through which they affect growth may also
be heterogeneous. Table 3.9 displays the estimates for the effect of large terrorist
attacks and natural disasters on investment. These results show that investment
as a share of GDP remains statistically unchanged irrespective of the type of event
examined here and regardless of whether it occurred in a developed or an emerging
economy.
Table 3.10 presents the estimations of the effect of large natural disasters and terrorist
attacks on military expenditure as a share of GDP. The results illustrate increased
military expenditures due to terrorist attacks in emerging economies. This increase in
military expenditures in emerging economies is driven by domestic terrorist attacks.
A one percent increase in deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country due to domes-
tic terrorism increases military expenditures as a share of GDP contemporaneously
by 6.03 percent in emerging economies. Although military expenditures increase in
the wake of domestic terrorist attacks in emerging economies, this increase does not
translate to a change in GDP growth. Additionally, although transnational terrorism
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leads to an insignificant increase in military expenditures, the increase is not statisti-
cally different from the increase due to domestic terrorism. This suggests that there
is some increase in military expenditures of emerging economies due to transnational
terrorism as well.
Table 3.11 reports the results of the response of non-military expenditures to large
terrorist attacks and natural disasters as well as their different types. The estimates
show that on average terrorist attacks and natural disasters do not significantly affect
non-military expenditures in developed and emerging economies. However, examining
the different types of natural disasters shows an increase in emerging economies due to
floods, while these expenditures decrease in developed countries as a result of storms.
The increase in non-military expenditures in the aftermath of floods in emerging
economies indicates that resources are being used to repair and resume destroyed
infrastructure.
On average, developed countries are better able to absorb negative shocks in the form
of natural disasters as well as terrorist attacks. Although emerging economies expe-
rience no adverse effects on GDP growth due to transnational and domestic terrorist
attacks, military expenditures as a share of GDP experiences an increase in the wake
of domestic terrorist attacks. Emerging economies also experience adverse effects on
their GDP growth due to floods and storms. Floods in emerging economies result
in increased non-military government expenditures due to clean up and restoration.
The effect of storms on GDP growth, however, seems to mostly be due to the loss of
human life.
3.6 Robustness Checks
I consider an alternate specification to ensure the robustness of the main results
presented above. I use an indicator variable in place of the natural log of deaths per
thousand inhabitants. In this specification the event variable takes the value one if
63
the number of deaths caused by an event exceeds the threshold of the 75 percentile
deaths caused by the same event in a given year. These estimates are reported in
tables A.4 to A.7 in the appendix. Table A.4 reports the GDP growth model. These
results show that like the main results the occurrence of large terrorist attacks has no
significant effect on GDP growth, however the occurrence of large natural disasters
has a negative effect on growth. Although the main results show a decline in GDP
growth due to domestic terrorism, floods and storms, this effect is not visible in this
specification.
Table A.5 shows the response of investment as a share of GDP to this alternate spec-
ification. These results support the response observed in the main results. Table A.6
reports the estimates for the military expenditure channel. These results show that,
similar to the main results, terrorist attacks and domestic terrorist attacks lead to in-
creased military spending. However, this specification also shows a marginal increase
in military expenditures due to transnational terrorist attacks. Table A.7 displays
the estimates of the non-military expenditure channel. Unlike the main specification,
these results reveal a decline in non-military expenditures in the aftermath of ter-
rorism, although this effect is not observed for the disaggregated transnational and
domestic terrorism. Also, unlike the main specification, this specification does not
reveal any effects of floods on non-military expenditure.
For the next robustness check I relax the large event criteria and include all the years
when a country has experienced at least one event. Tables A.8 to A.11 report these
estimates. I find that these results closely follow the main results presented in the
previous section. This indicates that the effects that we observe for this specification
are driven by larger events.
Further, following the example of Cavallo et al. (2013) I redefine large events as events
that have led to fatalities greater than the 90th percentile and 99th percentile of the
world pooled distribution. Tables A.12 to A.15 presents the estimates when the 90th
64
percentile is used as the threshold to define large events. For the growth model these
results are very similar to the main results. For the channels, this specification shows
similar results for all models except for non-military government expenditures. Ta-
ble A.15 reports the results for non-military government expenditures. These results
show that like the main results domestic terrorist attacks reduced these expenditures
and floods increase them. Additionally, these results also show that these high in-
tensity storms lead to a marginally significant decline in non-military government
expenditures.
Table A.16 displays the results for GDP growth when the intensity measure for natural
disasters and terrorist attacks are further escalated to the 99th percentile. These
results show that even though collectively these highly intensive natural disasters do
not affect GDP growth, separately floods and storms continue to affect GDP growth
negatively. For domestic terrorism the marginal decline that is observed in the main
results is not significant for these specifications, although the sign on the coefficient
continues to be negative. Examining the channels for this specification in tables A.17
to A.19 shows that the results are similar to the main results except for in the case of
non-military government expenditures. Table A.19 shows that like the main results
floods increase non-military government expenditures, although the marginal decline
in these expenditures due to domestic terrorism is not observed. Furthermore, these
results also show that these high intensity storms lead to a marginally significant
decline in non-military government expenditures.
Overall, some of the differences in results suggest that the estimates are sensitive to
the measure of the events. This indicates that there are some details lost when using
an indicator variable as opposed to an intensity measure variable that varies within
the event type. The results also show that the response of growth and their channels
varies based on the intensity of the events.
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3.7 Key Findings
Natural disasters and terrorist attacks are similar in that they destroy physical and
human capital. In the aftermath of each, reconstruction efforts aim to bring the
country affected back on track. Despite this, they do not affect GDP growth in the
same way. Natural disasters lead to lower GDP growth, while terrorist attacks do not
affect growth. Further, the results here show that not all types of natural disasters
have a negative effect on GDP growth and not all types of terrorist attacks have no
significant effect on GDP growth. Among natural disasters, floods and storms lead to
lower GDP growth, while earthquakes result in no significant change in GDP growth.
Examining transnational terrorism and domestic terrorism shows that it is domestic
terrorism that leads to a decline in GDP growth.
Evaluating the channels through which these specific natural disasters and terror-
ist attacks affect GDP growth further reveals the difference between each of these
events. Disruption of infrastructure in the aftermath of floods is evident through
increased non-military expenditures. Domestic terrorist attacks lead to increased
military expenditures, suggesting that countries attempt to implement security mea-
sures to make their citizens feel more secure. It also experiences a countering decline
in non-military expenditures suggesting a shift in government expenditures.
Examining the effects of disasters separately for developed and emerging economies
brings to the forefront the inadequacy of emerging economies to absorb the shock of
natural disasters and terrorist attacks. It is evident from the results presented that
developed nations are better able to absorb the shock of the different types of terrorist
attacks as well as natural disasters. Although emerging economies are able to absorb
the shock of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks, the shock of a flood or a
storm leads to a fall in GDP growth. Examining the channels through which these
incidents affect growth in emerging economies sheds some light on the disaster relief
needs of these countries. The results show that floods affect GDP growth through
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higher non-military government expenditure. Hence, floods affect growth not only
through destruction and loss of human life, but also through increased government
expenditures. Storms on the other hand affect growth through loss of human life.
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3.8 Tables
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
All Developed Emerging
GDP Growth 0.0189 0.0216 0.0176
(0.0484) (0.0380) (0.0528)
Capital Formation (% of GDP) 22.34 23.93 21.55
(7.246) (5.954) (7.688)
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 75.43 88.01 69.20
(49.31) (65.34) (37.48)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 15.75 18.48 14.39
(5.859) (4.748) (5.884)
Military Expenditures (% of GDP) 2.523 2.994 2.269
(2.344) (3.114) (1.743)
Educational Attainment 18.74 28.95 13.68
(15.80) (14.69) (13.76)
Population growth 0.0164 0.00921 0.0199
(0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0112)
Polity 2 3.068 7.279 0.982
(7.018) (5.877) (6.589)
Terror (Deaths per thousand) 0.00141 0.000512 0.00190
(0.00698) (0.00253) (0.00844)
Transnational Terror (Deaths per thousand) 0.000672 0.000497 0.000779
(0.00504) (0.00246) (0.00610)
Domestic Terror (Deaths per thousand) 0.00114 0.000168 0.00159
(0.00565) (0.000948) (0.00677)
Natural Disaster (Deaths per thousand) 0.0123 0.00132 0.0170
(0.139) (0.00729) (0.166)
Flood (Deaths per thousand) 0.00276 0.000603 0.00344
(0.0306) (0.00181) (0.0350)
Earthquake (Deaths per thousand) 0.0334 0.00396 0.0416
(0.260) (0.0176) (0.294)
Storm (Deaths per thousand) 0.00654 0.000526 0.0109
(0.0919) (0.00118) (0.120)
N 4600 1524 3076
Countries 125 41 84
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
The table reports the pooled average of the variables for an unbalanced panel of countries spanning
from 1970 to 2015. The number of observations for military expenditures are 4293 for the full
sample, 1509 for the developed countries sample, and 2784 for the emerging countries sample.
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Table 3.2: Large Event Definition
Killed per thousand inhabitants of a country
Transnational Terrorism 0.0002
Domestic Terrorism 0.0005
Floods 0.0016
Earthquake 0.0010
Storms 0.0011
The table reports the deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country at the 75 percentile
of the World pooled distribution from 1970 to 2015.
Table 3.3: Number of Events
All Developed Emerging
Terror 532 97 435
(91) (22) (69)
Transnational Terrorism 359 104 255
(78) (19) (59)
Domestic Terrorism 396 40 356
(80) (16) (64)
Disaster 589 60 529
(92) (18) (74)
Flood 445 31 414
(89) (12) (77)
Earthquake 130 17 113
(39) (6) (33)
Storm 266 55 211
(68) (20) (48)
Overall No. of instances that result in accumulated deaths greater
than the 75 percentile of the world pooled deaths between due to a
specific type of event that a country experiences in a given year with
No. of Countries that have experienced these instances in parenthe-
sis. This data spans from 1970 to 2015.
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Table 3.4: Estimation of Growth Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.2468 -0.2474
(0.2344) (0.2343)
Transnationalit -0.1684
(0.4771)
Domesticit -0.3046
∗
(0.1766)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0200
∗ -0.0201∗
(0.0115) (0.0115)
Floodit -0.1415
∗∗∗
(0.0525)
Earthquakeit -0.0050
(0.0088)
Stormit -0.0316
∗∗∗
(0.0116)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0446∗∗∗ -0.0440∗∗∗ -0.0444∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058)
ln(Education)it -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0035
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Populationgrowthit -0.5574
∗∗∗ -0.5518∗∗∗ -0.5566∗∗∗ -0.5611∗∗∗
(0.1757) (0.1779) (0.1758) (0.1757)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0164∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0164∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0059)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)
ln(trade)it−1 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Polityit 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is GDP growth, the data spans from 1970
to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log of the intensity measure of
transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms. The
intensity measure is the number of deaths per thousand caused by an event when
it exceeds the 75th percentile of the worlds pooled distribution of deaths caused by
that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table 3.5: Estimation of Investment Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.5623 -0.5629
(0.9709) (0.9704)
Transnationalit -0.6917
(1.5246)
Domesticit -0.4620
(0.9924)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0226 -0.0227
(0.0679) (0.0679)
Floodit 0.2322
(0.1736)
Earthquakeit -0.0372
(0.0862)
Stormit -0.0453
(0.0637)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.1234∗∗ 0.1243∗∗ 0.1236∗∗ 0.1239∗∗
(0.0582) (0.0578) (0.0582) (0.0582)
ln(Education)it 0.0838
∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0287)
Populationgrowthit 3.8487
∗∗∗ 3.8609∗∗∗ 3.8494∗∗∗ 3.8575∗∗∗
(1.3860) (1.4004) (1.3861) (1.3981)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0803 -0.0806 -0.0804 -0.0807
(0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0498)
ln(trade)it−1 0.2754∗∗∗ 0.2755∗∗∗ 0.2753∗∗∗ 0.2755∗∗∗
(0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0587)
Polityit 0.0058
∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0058∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of Investment (% of GDP),
the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log
of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods,
earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths per
thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 75th percentile of the worlds
pooled distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table 3.6: Estimation of Military Expenditures Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit 4.5426
∗∗ 4.5438∗∗
(1.7983) (1.7995)
Transnationalit 2.5037
(2.8195)
Domesticit 5.9780
∗∗∗
(1.4995)
NaturalDisasterit 0.0363 0.0377
(0.0459) (0.0476)
Floodit -0.0027
(0.1094)
Earthquakeit 0.0962
(0.0718)
Stormit -0.1199
(0.0845)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0585 -0.0653 -0.0590 -0.0593
(0.0699) (0.0703) (0.0699) (0.0696)
ln(Education)it 0.0281 0.0295 0.0281 0.0276
(0.0350) (0.0346) (0.0350) (0.0351)
Populationgrowthit -2.5075 -2.5826
∗ -2.5093 -2.4086
(1.6146) (1.5416) (1.6145) (1.5377)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0491 0.0467 0.0493 0.0494
(0.0404) (0.0409) (0.0405) (0.0405)
ln(trade)it−1 -0.0712 -0.0729 -0.0711 -0.0703
(0.0464) (0.0467) (0.0464) (0.0462)
Polityit -0.0103
∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0102∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of military expenditures
(% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the
natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism,
floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths
per thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 75th percentile of the worlds
pooled distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table 3.7: Estimation of Non-Military Government Expenditures Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -1.3663 -1.3672
(1.1349) (1.1350)
Transnationalit 0.4564
(1.7980)
Domesticit -2.6764
∗
(1.5396)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0264 -0.0269
(0.0437) (0.0435)
Floodit 0.1943
∗∗
(0.0767)
Earthquakeit -0.0421
(0.0552)
Stormit -0.0559
(0.0341)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.0505 0.0527 0.0508 0.0512
(0.0655) (0.0655) (0.0656) (0.0656)
ln(Education)it 0.0114 0.0110 0.0114 0.0119
(0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0276)
Populationgrowthit -1.8774 -1.8540 -1.8761 -1.9632
(1.4011) (1.3965) (1.4014) (1.3903)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 -0.0450 -0.0443 -0.0451 -0.0456
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412)
ln(trade)it−1 0.1537∗∗∗ 0.1541∗∗∗ 0.1536∗∗∗ 0.1527∗∗∗
(0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0536)
Polityit 0.0123
∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of non-military expen-
ditures (% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest
are the natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic
terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number
of deaths per thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 75th percentile
of the worlds pooled distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table 3.8: Estimation of Growth Model for Developed and Emerging Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Developed Emerging Developed Emerging
Terrorit -0.2188 -0.1601
(0.2731) (0.2196)
Transnationalit -0.1962 -0.2040
(0.3665) (0.4913)
Domesticit -0.2171 -0.1349
(0.6969) (0.1907)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0177 -0.0183
(0.1067) (0.0114)
Floodit -1.5256 -0.1384
∗∗
(1.1181) (0.0543)
Earthquakeit 0.0655 -0.0033
(0.1228) (0.0084)
Stormit -0.7545 -0.0296
∗∗
(0.8613) (0.0147)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0412∗∗∗ -0.0470∗∗∗ -0.0424∗∗∗ -0.0472∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0077) (0.0067) (0.0078)
ln(Education)it -0.0001 -0.0054
∗ 0.0001 -0.0056∗
(0.0041) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0032)
Populationgrowthit -1.0078
∗∗∗ -0.1146 -1.0003∗∗∗ -0.1124
(0.1658) (0.2939) (0.1658) (0.3008)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0435∗∗∗ -0.0140∗∗ -0.0446∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0065) (0.0078) (0.0065)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0108 0.0104∗ 0.0109 0.0106∗
(0.0156) (0.0058) (0.0156) (0.0057)
ln(trade)it−1 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0352∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0075) (0.0101) (0.0075)
Polityit 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
N 1524 3076 1524 3076
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is GDP growth, the data spans from 1970
to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log of the intensity measure of
transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms. The
intensity measure is the number of deaths per thousand caused by an event when it
exceeds the 75th percentile of the worlds pooled distribution of deaths caused by that
event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table 3.9: Estimation of Investment Model for Developed and Emerging Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Developed Emerging Developed Emerging
Terrorit 0.0001 -0.6575
(2.8617) (1.0531)
Transnationalit 2.7722 -1.8156
(1.8111) (1.3963)
Domesticit -11.1333 0.1141
(10.3188) (1.0973)
NaturalDisasterit -0.1317 0.0234
(0.3192) (0.0594)
Floodit 1.4107 0.2195
(6.7210) (0.2164)
Earthquakeit -0.2076 -0.0012
(0.1909) (0.0738)
Stormit -1.4438 0.0533
(3.3587) (0.0749)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.1817∗∗ 0.1012 0.1823∗∗ 0.1019
(0.0726) (0.0724) (0.0734) (0.0725)
ln(Education)it -0.0500 0.0520 -0.0493 0.0520
(0.0339) (0.0344) (0.0338) (0.0345)
Populationgrowthit 1.2174 6.2978
∗∗ 1.1877 6.4015∗∗
(1.3918) (2.4370) (1.3796) (2.4401)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.4028∗∗∗ -0.0223 -0.4036∗∗∗ -0.0223
(0.0953) (0.0508) (0.0949) (0.0507)
ln(trade)it−1 0.1443∗∗ 0.3104∗∗∗ 0.1426∗∗ 0.3112∗∗∗
(0.0690) (0.0694) (0.0692) (0.0695)
Polityit 0.0088
∗∗ 0.0010 0.0088∗∗ 0.0010
(0.0039) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0029)
N 1524 3076 1524 3076
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of Investment (% of GDP),
the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log of the
intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods, earthquake,
and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths per thousand caused
by an event when it exceeds the 75th percentile of the worlds pooled distribution of
deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table 3.10: Estimation of Military Expenditures Model for Developed and Emerging
Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Developed Emerging Developed Emerging
Terrorit 0.2383 4.7051
∗∗
(1.3472) (1.9235)
Transnationalit 0.7619 2.6458
(1.2672) (2.9895)
Domesticit -1.6236 6.0345
∗∗∗
(8.0118) (1.5867)
NaturalDisasterit 0.6616 0.0490
(0.9728) (0.0476)
Floodit -6.4852 -0.0352
(3.8971) (0.1230)
Earthquakeit 0.8738 0.1069
(0.9739) (0.0696)
Stormit 4.4278 -0.0934
(4.6314) (0.0949)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.0613 -0.0553 0.0580 -0.0553
(0.0554) (0.1049) (0.0555) (0.1046)
ln(Education)it 0.0098 -0.0020 0.0094 -0.0027
(0.0512) (0.0409) (0.0512) (0.0411)
Populationgrowthit -1.3231 -2.7018 -1.2984 -2.5146
(1.2331) (2.8218) (1.2349) (2.6791)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 -0.1224∗ 0.0509 -0.1209∗ 0.0506
(0.0647) (0.0468) (0.0634) (0.0469)
ln(trade)it−1 0.0872 -0.0879 0.0857 -0.0869
(0.1080) (0.0539) (0.1074) (0.0538)
Polityit -0.0164
∗∗ -0.0105∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0041)
N 1509 2784 1509 2784
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of Military Expenditures
(% of GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the
natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism,
floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths per
thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 75th percentile of the worlds pooled
distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table 3.11: Estimation of Non-Military Government Expenditures Model for Devel-
oped and Emerging Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Developed Emerging Developed Emerging
Terrorit 1.6202 -0.8521
(1.3598) (1.2502)
Transnationalit 2.6717 0.4505
(1.6164) (2.3876)
Domesticit -3.3418 -1.7121
(3.5050) (1.3584)
NaturalDisasterit -0.1191 -0.0378
(0.4927) (0.0512)
Floodit -3.7749 0.2538
∗∗∗
(3.1579) (0.0926)
Earthquakeit 0.1603 -0.0645
(0.2719) (0.0648)
Stormit -15.2554
∗∗∗ -0.0487
(4.1464) (0.0350)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0443 0.0515 -0.0518 0.0516
(0.1360) (0.0613) (0.1348) (0.0614)
ln(Education)it 0.0472 0.0314 0.0491 0.0322
(0.0346) (0.0364) (0.0342) (0.0365)
Populationgrowthit -5.0335
∗∗∗ -0.2981 -4.9816∗∗∗ -0.4158
(1.4863) (2.0229) (1.4899) (2.0354)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 -0.2384∗∗ -0.0015 -0.2374∗∗ -0.0016
(0.1125) (0.0406) (0.1121) (0.0406)
ln(trade)it−1 -0.1303 0.1999∗∗∗ -0.1303 0.1994∗∗∗
(0.0967) (0.0612) (0.0968) (0.0612)
Polityit 0.0175
∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0038) (0.0072) (0.0038)
N 1509 2784 1509 2784
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of Non-Military Expenditures
(% of GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the
natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism,
floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths per
thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 75th percentile of the worlds pooled
distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Chapter 4 The Path to Recovery in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks
4.1 Introduction
Terrorist attacks, both transnational and domestic, aim to cause the most damage on
the economies of their target countries by damaging human capital, physical capital
and economic institutions. These incidents can be fatal to businesses by obstructing
regular operations. In addition, literature reveals that terrorist attacks increase uncer-
tainty leading to decreased foreign direct investment (FDI) (Abadie and Gardeazabal,
2008; Enders and Sandler, 1996). For developing countries, FDI is a crucial source
of financing. Examining the response of growth and its disaggregated industrial, ser-
vice, and agricultural sector value added component can help quantify the effect that
terrorism has on growth through obstruction to the normal operation of businesses.
For this purpose, in this chapter, I examine the mean response of GDP growth along
with its disaggregated industrial, service, and agricultural sector components in the
aftermath of transnational as well as domestic terrorist attacks. Utilizing a panel
VAR methodology, I find that GDP growth experiences no significant change due to
the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transnational
terrorist attacks. Similarly, fatalities per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by
domestic terrorist attacks also lead to no significant change to GDP growth. Examin-
ing the effects of transnational and domestic terrorism by the disaggregated sectoral
growth shows that there is no significant change in the growth rate of either industrial,
service, or agricultural sector due to casualties caused by transnational or domestic
terrorist attacks.
Studies in the past have focused on a specific incident or a broad range of transna-
tional as well as domestic terrorist attacks. Studies on a broad range of transnational
terrorist attacks have found that transnational terrorist attacks negatively influence
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growth (Blomberg et al., 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009, 2011). Blomberg et
al. (2004) use a structural VAR model to examine the effects of transnational ter-
rorism on GDP growth and their channels. They find that transnational terrorism
has a negative effect on growth. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) examine the long
run effects and the transmission channels of transnational terrorism on growth using
a standard growth model. They focus on Asian countries in this study. Gaibul-
loev and Sandler (2011) use the same methodology to examine the long run growth
effects of transnational as well as domestic terrorist attacks in Africa. They find
that transnational terrorism negatively affects growth, while domestic terrorism has
no significant effect on growth. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008), on the other hand
find a decline in growth due to domestic terrorist attacks in Western Europe. Thus
studies have found heterogeneous effects of transnational and domestic terrorist at-
tacks. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011) also suggest various reasons for the difference
in response of growth to transnational and domestic terrorist attacks affect. They
contend that since domestic terrorist attacks occur more frequently than transna-
tional terrorist attacks, people and businesses accept domestic terrorism as part of
their daily routine creating the perception of a persistent shock in case of domestic
terrorism. They argue that countermeasures for domestic terrorism does not require
additional border security and offensive operations in foreign countries and are there-
fore cheaper to implement. Studies by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) and Enders
and Sandler (1996) that are focused on transnational terrorism have found that they
have a negative effect on foreign direct investment which is an important source of
savings for developing countries. Furthermore, the threat of transnational terrorism
may curb the inflow of foreign aid. Hence following the example of previous studies, I
distinguish between transnational and domestic terrorist attacks and find that there
are no differences in the way that growth and its components respond to these dif-
ferent types of terrorism for this sample of countries. The literature predominantly
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focuses on the long run effects of terrorism on GDP growth. A study by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) utilizes synthetic control methodology to evaluate the incidents
in the Basque region of Spain and find that these attacks led to a 10% loss in GDP
per capita during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Although the literature is comprehensive,
it fails to distinguish between the dynamic response of GDP growth to transnational
and domestic terrorist attacks.
Studies have also focused on investigating the channels through which these inci-
dents affect growth by examining some of the traditional factors of growth like in-
vestment and government spending (Blomberg et al., 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler,
2008, 2009, 2011). Several studies show that increased uncertainty due to terrorism,
both transnational and domestic, reduces investment and foreign direct investment
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003, 2008; Enders and Sandler, 1996; Bandyopadhyay
et al., 2013). Studies have also found differences in the channels through which do-
mestic and transnational terrorism may influence growth. Blomberg et al. (2004)
observe that transnational terrorism leads to redirection of resources from invest-
ment spending to government expenditures. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) find that
transnational terrorist attacks lead to decreased investment while domestic terrorist
attacks cause governments to redirect spending towards security and away from more
growth enhancing public and private investments. This chapter adds to this body
of literature by focusing on the disaggregated value added components of GDP as a
channel through which transnational and domestic terrorism may affect growth.
Instances like the IRA attacks on London’s financial district at the Baltic Exchange
on April 10, 1992 resulted in $800 million in lost business (Gaibulloev and Sandler,
2009). This would suggest that domestic terrorist attacks also increase the cost
of doing business because of higher wages, larger insurance premiums, and greater
security expenditures. Destroyed infrastructure leads to business disruption. Each of
these factors are relevant even for transnational terrorism. Gunasekar et al. (2018)
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find that India experienced a decline in tourism in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai
transnational terrorist attacks. This too suggests a decrease in business activity.
Examining the effect of transnational and domestic terrorism on industrial, service
and agricultural value added components of growth can shed some light on the extent
to which business activity is affected.
The effect of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks on business activities may
vary based on developed and emerging countries. This would reflect in the response
of GDP growth and its disaggregated components. Studies about transnational and
domestic terrorist attacks have observed this differential effect on growth in devel-
oped and emerging countries (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009, 2011). They find that
developed economies are adept at counter-acting the negative effects of transnational
and domestic terrorist attacks, while emerging economies experience some adverse
effects. Additionally, a decline in foreign direct investment due to terrorism can be
far more fatal for emerging economies. I therefore also focus my investigation into
the path of growth and the sectoral channels through which these destructive events
affect growth on emerging economies separately. I find that emerging economies ex-
perience no significant effects due to the casualties of transnational and domestic
terrorist attacks.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Definition of Terrorism, Transnational Terrorism, and Domestic
Terrorism
Terrorism is broadly defined as the use of violence and intimidation in order to gain
political or social leverage. A feature of terrorism is that it usually circumvents
democratic processes by threatening the citizens of the target country. Hence the
objective behind the violence goes beyond the victims of the incident. Another as-
pect of terrorism is that it is initiated by either individuals or groups. Terrorism
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includes state-sponsored terrorism, where a state provides assistance by providing a
safe-haven, financing, or information. However, it does not include a state employing
violence against its own citizens. This definition is similar to the one defined by the
U.S. Department of State (2003: xii): ‘terrorism means premeditated, politically mo-
tivated violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience’.
Enders et al. (2011) classify terrorism as domestic terrorism and transnational terror-
ism. Domestic terrorism is home grown and affects only the host country, institutions,
citizens, property, and policies. The venue, target, and victims, and event initiators
are from the same country. An example of terrorism is the bombing and shooting in
Norway on July 22, 2011 which killed 77 people. As per the definition of terrorism
and domestic terrorism, most terrorist incidents enacted for the purpose of indepen-
dence are classified as a domestic terrorist attack. For instance, terror attacks by
Sikh extremists in India during the Khalistan movement in 1984 would be classified
as domestic terror incidents. This would include the assassination of former Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh extremists in New Delhi, India on October 31, 1984.
Transnational terrorism concerns more than one country. For instance, international
skyjacking or the mailing of a letter bomb to another country constitutes transna-
tional terrorism. The shootings and hostage situation in Mumbai, India on November
26, 2008 is one such example. Another example is the shooting down of a Russian
airline in Egypt on October 31, 2015. In each instance there was involvement of
individuals from different countries, either as victims, as perpetrators or both.
4.2.2 Data Description
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) provides data for the macroe-
conomic indicators that I use for my analysis. I use the following annual data from
the WDI: (1) GDP per capita, (2) industry, value added, (3) services, value added,
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(4) agriculture, value added, (5) gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP,
(6) government expenditure as a share of GDP. World Bank Analytical Classification
groups countries based on their income into high, upper middle, lower middle, and
low income countries. Using these data, I classify upper middle, lower middle, and
low income countries in 2015 as emerging economies.
The data on terrorism is obtained from Global Terrorist Database (GTD). This
dataset includes violent incidents that are instigated by individuals or groups. The
dataset also requires that two out of the following three conditions be met for an
incident to be classified as a terrorist attack: (1) the incident was aimed at achieving
a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (2) it was intended to strong arm or
be a message to individuals other than the victims; and (3) it violated International
Humanitarian Law. GTD includes data on domestic as well as transnational terrorist
attacks. However, it does not distinguish between the two. For this reason, I fol-
low the steps outlined by Enders et al. (2011) to distinguish between domestic and
transnational terrorist attack. The steps are as follows:
1. Remove any event that does not satisfy conditions defined by the GTD dataset
as a terrorist attack.
2. Exclude events that have been flagged as doubtful by the dataset.
3. The next steps identify transnational terrorist incidents from among the re-
maining observations
a) GTD reports the nationality of three victims. If the nationality of at least
one of these reported victims is different from the target country reported
by GTD, flag the observation as a transnational terrorist attack.
b) Diplomatic targets like foreign emissaries, embassies, consulates, and diplo-
matic staff, families, and property along with non-government organi-
zations (NGO) that are mostly multinational in nature are considered
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transnational targets. GTD identifies the target type. If an incident tar-
gets a diplomatic entity, or an NGO, the incident is considered transna-
tional.
c) If the incident targets a U.S. entity outside of the USA or an international
entity like the UN, the incident is classified as a transnational terror attack.
d) GTD reports U.S. specific information like fatalities, hostages, wounded
etc. If these reports indicate that one of these U.S specific events may
be involved outside of the USA, flag the incident as a transnational terror
attack.
e) In case of hijackings or kidnappings, GTD reports the country in which this
incident concluded or if there was a diversion. If this country is different
from the origin country flag the event as a transnational incident.
f) GTD also identifies incidents as having international ideologies or geogra-
phy. In addition to the above steps described by Enders et al. (2011), I
distinguish these incidents as transnational terrorist attacks.
4. From among the observations that have not been flagged as transnational, an
incident that has information missing about the nationality of the victims, or
the target type is considered uncertain. Also incidents that are missing informa-
tion regarding U.S. fatalities, wounded, hijackings, or ransoms are considered
uncertain. I drop these uncertain events.
5. The remaining incidents that are not marked as transnational are identified as
domestic terrorist incidents.
A concern with terrorist attacks is that they could be endogenous to economic fac-
tors. Although studies have failed to show any influence of development indicators
on terrorism, several studies find that ethno-religious diversity, increased state re-
pression, political volatility are good predictors of terrorism (Piazza, 2007; Abadie,
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2006; Crenshaw, 1981). Studies also show that socio-economic conditions play a part
in the circumstance from which terrorists originate. They suggest that an individ-
ual may feel disadvantaged in the face of extreme economic inequality resulting in
him turning to violence to change the status quo (Gurr, 1970; Blomberg, Hess and
Weerapana, 2004). A cycle of violent behavior can lead an individual to believe that
the opportunity cost of terrorism is low and the payout is higher relative to his cur-
rent occupation. Lai (2007) finds that the contrary case of high income levels along
with low levels of income inequality result in lower levels of terrorism production.
Studies have also suggested that quality of economic institutions and trade open-
ness are other socio-economic factors that have a negative impact on the generation
of terrorists (Basuchoudhary and Shughart, 2010; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, and
Klemmensen, 2006). Literature extensively shows that economic factors play a key
role in the creation of terrorists. The creation of terrorists and the decision to under-
take a terrorist act as described by literature is based on pre-existing scoio-economic
conditions. Hence it can be assumed that transnational and domestic terrorism are
predetermined relative to the economic variables being examined here.
The final dataset consists of an unbalanced panel of annual data for 109 countries
spanning from 1970 to 2015. This includes 71 emerging economies1. Table 4.1 presents
the summary statistics of the macroeconomic variables as well as the average fraction
of the population that has died due to transnational and domestic terrorist attacks.
The table shows that the average GDP growth over the period of 1970 to 2015 is
2.17%. It also illustrates that growth in emerging economies of 2.28% exceeds the
growth of the entire sample suggesting higher growth than developed economies. A
similar pattern can be observed in industrial, service and agricultural sector growth in
emerging economies. The summary statistics reveal that on average 0.0001 people per
thousand inhabitants of a country die due to transnational terrorist attacks whereas
1The list of the countries can be found in the appendix.
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domestic terrorist attacks leads to higher fatalities of 0.0004 per thousand inhabitants
of a country. For the full sample, as well as developed and emerging economy sub-
samples, the data reveals that there have been more incidents of domestic terrorism
than transnational terrorism. The data shows that the likelihood of a developed
economy in the sample experiencing a transnational terrorist attack is 32.3% while
the likelihood of an emerging economy experiencing one is 36.3%. This suggests that
a developed economy is as likely to experience a transnational terrorist attack as
an emerging economy. Whereas for domestic terrorist attacks the data reveals that
emerging economies are more likely to experience a domestic terrorist attack with a
probability of 47.5% compared to developed economies where the probability of an
attack is 35.7%.
4.3 Methodology
Consider the following panel VAR with panel fixed effects:
yi,t = Φ1yi,t−1 + αi + δt + εi,t (4.1)
where, i = 1, 2, · · · , N is the country index and the time index for country i is
t = −1, 0, 1,· · · , Ti. αi is the country fixed effect and δt is the time fixed effect.
I assume the error structure in the above equation to be homogeneous, such that.
E(εi,tε
′
i,t) = ω for all i and t. I also assume that the errors are independent across
time and countries, i.e. E(εi,sε
′
i,t) = 0, s 6= t, and E(εi,sε′j,t) = 0, for any s and t
where i 6= j.
yi,t is a 5 × 1 vector of variables that include (1) domestic terrorist attacks, (2)
transnational terrorist attacks, (3) the growth rate of fixed capital formation as a
share of GDP, (4) the growth rate of government consumption expenditures as a
share of GDP and (5) either growth rates of real GDP per capita, real industrial
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sector value added per capita, real service sector value added per capita, or real
agricultural sector value added per capita.
yi,t =

Domestic terrorismi,t
Transnational terrorismi,t
Capital formationi,t
Government consumptioni,t
GDP / Industry / Service / Agri. growthi,t

The transnational and domestic terrorist attack variables are the natural log of the
number of deaths per thousand inhabitants that occurred due each in country i in
time t. Due to the censored nature of these two variables, the results of the above
estimation might be biased. In case of censured models, consistent estimators can be
obtained using restricted maximum likelihood estimators as described by Kilian and
Vigfusson (2009). Even though, I do not implement this estimation method here, I
plan to do so in future research.
Nickell (1981) shows that the panel fixed effect estimator for a dynamic model with a
fixed and small T is inconsistent. However, if the errors are serially uncorrelated, the
first difference transformation can be consistently estimated by instrumenting lagged
differences and levels of yi,t (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). I use the second and third
lags of the dependent variables as instruments.
Based on the vast growth literature (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003;
Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; among others), I include some determinants of
growth as one of the dependent variables. The order of the variables for the purpose
of determining the orthogonal impulse response is as mentioned above. Using past
literature as a basis, I assume that the terror variables affect the macroeconomic
indicators contemporaneously, however macroeconomic indicators do not affect the
terror variables contemporaneously (Blomberg et al., 2004). I assume that domestic
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terrorist attacks can affect transnational terrorist attacks contemporaneously and
not vice versa2. Within the macroeconomic variables, I assume that GDP growth
is affected by the remaining macroeconomic variables as well as the terror variables
contemporaneously. I further assume that growth in investment as a share of GDP
affects growth in government expenditures as a share of GDP contemporaneously3. I
cluster the standard errors at the country level and use a 1000 Monte Carlo simulation
draws to plot the confidence intervals of the cumulative orthogonal impulse responses.
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) note that the pooling of multiple panels has the advantage
of relaxing the time stationarity assumption. They also state that the presence of
an explosive process may lead to difficulty in interpreting the model. For ease of
interpretation, I conduct a series by series unit root test using DF-GLS, augmented
Dickey Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test on the macroeconomic indicator levels as
well as their growth rates. Table 4.2 reports the results of these tests. The test results
for log levels show that we fail to reject the null of a unit root for the vast majority
of the series. For this reason, I use log differences of the macroeconomic variables.
I estimate the moment and model selection criteria (MMSC) that are analogous to the
Akaike information criteria (MAIC), Bayesian information criteria (MBIC), and the
Hannan-Quinn information criteria (MQIC) along with Hansen’s (1982) J statistic
of over-identifying restrictions to identify the appropriate lag structure. Table 4.3
reports these statistics. In the table, p represents the lags for the dependent variable.
Since Hansen’s (1982) J statistic of over-identifying restrictions is smaller for two lags,
I estimate my models with two lags. For consistency and to simplify interpretation
across estimations, I use the same number of lags for all of the models.
2To test the robustness of this assumption I reverse the order of transnational and domestic
terrorist attacks and find that the results are similar to the base case.
3I test the robustness of this assumption by reversing this order. I find that the results are
basically the same as the base case.
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4.4 The Path of the Economy in the Aftermath of Terrorism
Figure 4.1 illustrates the cumulative orthogonal impulse response of GDP growth,
government consumption expenditures and investment to a one standard deviation
shock to the number of fatalities per thousand inhabitants caused by transnational
and domestic terrorist attacks. The shaded area represents the 90% confidence in-
tervals. The results show that the cumulative effect of the number of deaths due
to transnational terrorism on growth is insignificant for the horizon under analysis.
These findings are at odds with the findings of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009, 2011)
and Blomberg et al. (2004) who find that transnational terrorist attacks lead to
lower GDP growth. The difference in results could be due to difference in the sample
period, geography, or methodology. Investigating potential channels through which
transnational terrorist attacks drives the effect on GDP growth shows that govern-
ment expenditures as well as investment experience no change following a transna-
tional terrorist attack.
The figure also reveals an insignificant effect on GDP growth due to fatalities caused
by domestic terrorist attacks. Although these findings are in accordance with findings
of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011) who find that domestic terrorism in Africa has no
significant effect on GDP growth though their coefficient expresses negative growth,
they are contrary to findings of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008). Gaibulloev and
Sandler (2008) find that that domestic terrorism in Western Europe leads to lower
GDP growth. Exploring the response of government expenditures and investment to
domestic terrorism reveal that these indicators also experience no significant change.
The results reported in figure 4.1 show a similar response of GDP growth in the after-
math of the two types of terrorist attacks. This suggests that the reasons illustrated
by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011) for the difference in response to the transnational
and domestic terrorist attacks may not necessarily hold. While the estimation results
suggest the effect of transnational and domestic terrorism on GDP growth is insignifi-
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cant, aggregation across different sectors might mask variation in the responses across
different industries. After all, terrorist attack tend to occur more often in areas where
manufacturing and services are the main economic activities. Examining the value
added growth rates of the different sectors in the aftermath of domestic terrorism
sheds some light on the sectors through which GDP growth is negatively affected.
Figure 4.2 plots the cumulative response of industrial sector value added growth to
fatalities caused by transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The figures show
that a one standard deviation shock to the number of fatalities per thousand inhab-
itants of a country due to transnational terrorism leads to no significant change in
industrial sector growth. Further the figure reveals that a one standard deviation
shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country due to domestic
terrorist attacks also does not lead to any significant change in the growth rate of the
industrial sector.
Figure 4.3 graphs the cumulative response of growth in service sector to casualties of
transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The results show that, in the aftermath
of a one standard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants
of a nation due to transnational terrorism, service sector growth experiences no sig-
nificant change. Similarly, a one standard deviation shock to the number of fatalities
per thousand habitant of a country due to domestic terrorist attacks has no significant
effect on service sector growth.
Figure 4.4 plots the cumulative response of growth in the agricultural sector in the
aftermath of casualties cause by transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The
figures illustrates that agricultural sector growth experiences no significant change due
to a one standard deviation increase in fatalities per thousand people of a country due
to transnational terrorist attack. Casualties due to domestic terrorism too, exhibit
no adverse effects on the growth of the agricultural sector.
The above results show that the response of GDP growth and its disaggregated value
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added sector growth to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country
due to transnational and domestic terrorist attacks does not vary. The insignificant
change to economic growth illustrates that on average, countries have adjusted to
the frequent occurrence of these events within a year. Additionally, the variable
of transnational and domestic terrorist attack measures the intensity of the fatalities
that an event causes, however, the data reveals that not all incidents cause casualties.
These incidents are not accounted for in the analysis. Furthermore, although the
intensity measure of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks accounts for the
number of deaths this may have a very small effect economic growth, specifically
when the number of deaths is a very small fraction of the total population of a
country. This measure also fails to account for damages to physical capital which
may play a larger role in disruption of regular business operations.
4.4.1 Emerging Economies
An important source of financing for emerging economies is through foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). Studies by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) and Enders and Sandler
(1996) have found that terrorism has a negative effect on foreign direct investment.
For this reason, it is important to examine the response of GDP growth and its dis-
aggregated value added sectors in emerging economies to transnational and domestic
terrorism. I define emerging economies as countries that are classified as upper mid-
dle, lower middle, and low income in 2015.
Figure 4.5 graphs the cumulative response of GDP growth, government consumption
expenditures and investment to the number of fatalities per thousand inhabitants
caused by transnational and domestic terrorism in emerging economies. The figure
shows that a one standard deviation shock to the number of fatalities per thousand
inhabitants of a country due to transnational terrorist attacks leads to no signifi-
cant change in GDP growth of emerging countries for the entire duration of analysis.
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A one standard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants
of a country due to domestic terrorist attacks also results in no significant change
in GDP growth for the duration of the analysis. The estimated responses suggest
that the response of GDP growth to the deaths caused by transnational and domes-
tic terrorist attacks is not different in emerging countries. Investigating potential
channels through which transnational and domestic terrorist attacks drive the effect
on GDP growth in emerging economies shows that government expenditures as well
as investment experience no change following a transnational or domestic terrorist
attack.
Although examining the response of GDP growth in emerging economies reveals that
they cause no significant harm to the economy of an emerging economy, aggregation
across different sectors might mask variation in the responses across different indus-
tries. Figure 4.6 graphs the cumulative response of industrial sector growth to the
number of fatalities per thousand inhabitants of a country due to these different types
of terrorist incidents in emerging economies. These figures show that a one standard
deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country due
to transnational terrorist attacks has no significant effect on growth in the industrial
sector. Additionally, the industrial sector growth experiences no significant change
due to a one standard deviation shock to the number of casualties per thousand
inhabitants of a country caused by domestic terrorist attacks in an emerging country.
Figure 4.7 plots the cumulative response of service sector growth in emerging economies
to a one standard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants
of a country due transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. In emerging countries,
the service sector experiences no significant change due to a one standard deviation
shock to the number of fatalities per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by
transnational terrorist attacks. A similar insignificant change in service sector growth
is observed due to a one standard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thou-
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sand inhabitants of a country caused by a domestic terrorist attack.
Figure 4.8 graphs the cumulative response of agricultural sector growth to the number
of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country due to the two types of terrorist
attacks in an emerging economy. These results illustrate that agricultural growth
remains unaffected by a one standard deviation shock to the number of fatalities per
thousand inhabitants of a country due to both transnational and domestic terrorist
attack throughout the horizon being examined.
Examining the data fo emerging countries shows that the economy of emerging coun-
tries like that of the entire sample experience no adverse effects of the deaths caused
by transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The results reaffirm that the re-
sponse of economies does not vary based on transnational and domestic terrorism for
this sample of countries.
4.5 Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks
I consider a number of alternate specifications to ensure the robustness of the main
results presented above. First, I consider estimation of the above model with different
ordering of the terrorism variables. The cumulative response of the GDP growth
to transnational and domestic terrorist attacks estimated with the assumption that
transnational terrorism affects domestic terrorism, but not vice versa is illustrated
in figure A.7. This shows that the path of the cumulative response is similar for
transnational as well as domestic terrorist attacks. Figures A.8 to A.10 graph the
results for growth in different sectors. These results illustrate similar response as the
base case for transnational and domestic terrorist attacks.
Next, I examine the robustness of the ordering of investment as a share of GDP
and government expenditures as a share of GDP by reversing their order. Figures
A.11 to A.14 present the cumulative response of GDP growth and the growth in its
disaggregated sector under this specification. The results show that the cumulative
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responses to transnational and domestic terrorist attacks remain basically unchanged
relative to the benchmark throughout the horizon of analysis.
Overall, the results from the above robustness checks suggest that the cumulative
response to domestic and transnational terrorism observed in the base case are not
sensitive to the originally defined specification.
4.6 Key Findings
The deaths caused by transnational and domestic terrorist attacks have no statisti-
cally significant effect on GDP growth within a year. Examining the effects on the
government and investment component of GDP reveals that these components are
also unaffected by the deaths caused by the two types of terrorist attacks. Further,
examining the effects of fatalities due to transnational and domestic terrorist attacks
on the disaggregated value added sectoral growth shows no significant change in ei-
ther the industrial, services, or agricultural sectors. These results suggest that the
response of the economy to the casualties of transnational terrorist attacks is not
different from that of the casualties of domestic terrorist attacks.
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4.7 Tables
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
All Emerging
GDP Growth 0.0217 0.0228
(0.0432) (0.0464)
Industrial Growth 0.0205 0.0240
(0.0707) (0.0733)
Service Growth 0.0258 0.0271
(0.0474) (0.0525)
Agricultural Growth 0.00455 0.00571
(0.0784) (0.0744)
Capital Formation Growth 0.00306 0.00612
(0.131) (0.148)
Government Consumption Growth 0.00225 0.00246
(0.110) (0.127)
Transnational Terrorist Attack 0.000146 0.000141
(0.00126) (0.000942)
Domestic Terrorist Attacks 0.000456 0.000625
(0.00291) (0.00345)
N 2707 1881
Countries 109 71
Note: The table reports the pooled average of the variables for an un-
balanced panel of countries spanning from 1970 to 2015. The standard
deviations are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 4.2: Unit Root Tests of Economic Indicators
Levels First Difference
DF-GLS ADF PP DF-GLS ADF PP
Investment 14 17 17 84 90 90
(109) (109) (109) (109) (109) (109)
Government Consumption 16 24 24 94 97 97
(109) (109) (109) (109) (109) (109)
GDP Growth 8 8 8 78 85 85
(109) (105) (105) (109) (109) (109)
Industry Growth 9 16 16 83 86 86
(109) (108) (108) (109) (109) (109)
Services Growth 7 11 11 75 82 82
(109) (104) (104) (109) (109) (109)
Agricultural Growth 36 23 23 104 104 104
(109) (109) (109) (109) (109) (109)
Note: Overall No. of Countries that reject unit root with total No. of Countries in parenthesis.
Significance level is at 10%
Table 4.3: Information Criteria for Lag Structure
Number of Lags
p=1 p=2
All
MAIC -63.38702 -32.54955
MBIC -347.3265 -174.5193
MQIC -167.2332 -84.47264
J 36.61298 17.45045
Emerging Countries
MAIC -71.67993 -36.43285
MBIC -338.2002 -169.693
MQIC -170.883 -86.03439
J 28.32007 13.56715
Note: The table reports the model selection criteria estimates anal-
ogous to Akaike infomration criteria (MAIC), Bayesian informa-
tion criteria (MBIC), Hannan-Quinn information criteria (MQIC)
for the panel VAR model, and Hansen’s (1982) J statistic of over-
identifying restrictions. p represents the number of lags of the
dependent variables to include in the model. The model uses two,
three and four lags of the dependent variables as instruments for
the calculation of these information criteria estimates.
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4.8 Figures
Figure 4.1: Cumulative Response of GDP Growth, Government Consumption, and
Investment
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of government consumption expenditures,
investment, and GDP growth to a one standard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand
inhabitants of a country caused by transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The top panel plots
the response to transnational terrorism and the lower panel plots the response to domestic terrorism.
The solid line plots the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval.
98
Figure 4.2: Cumulative Response of Industrial Sector Growth
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of industrial sector growth to a one standard
deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transna-
tional and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transnational
terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line plots
the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative Response of Service Sector Growth
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of service sector growth to a one standard
deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transna-
tional and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transnational
terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line plots
the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative Response of Agricultural Sector Growth
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of agricultural sector growth to a one stan-
dard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by
transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transna-
tional terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line
plots the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 4.5: Cumulative Response of GDP Growth, Government Consumption, and
Investment in Emerging Economies
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of government consumption expenditures,
investment, and GDP growth of emerging economies to a one standard deviation shock to the
number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transnational and domestic
terrorist attacks. The top panel plots the response to transnational terrorism and the lower panel
plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line plots the response while the shaded region
represents the 90% confidence interval.
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Figure 4.6: Cumulative Response of Industrial Sector Growth in Emerging Economies
−10
−5
0
5
10
−10
−5
0
5
10
0 2 4 6 0 2 4 6
Transnational Domestic
90% CI Cumulative Orthogonalized IRF
Years
Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of industrial sector growth in emerging
economies to a one standard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants
of a country caused by transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots
the response to transnational terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic
terrorism. The solid line plots the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence
interval.
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Figure 4.7: Cumulative Response of Service Sector Growth in Emerging Economies
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of service sector growth in emerging
economies to a one standard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants
of a country caused by transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots
the response to transnational terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic
terrorism. The solid line plots the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence
interval.
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Figure 4.8: Cumulative Response of Agricultural Sector Growth in Emerging
Economies
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of agricultural sector growth in emerging
economies to a one standard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants
of a country caused by transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots
the response to transnational terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic
terrorism. The solid line plots the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence
interval.
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Appendix A
A.1 Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1.1 Definitions and Sources
Table A.1: Definitions and Sources of the Variables
Variable Definitions Source
Employment Total number of peopled employed in a
county
Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Quarterly
Census of Employ-
ment and Wages
Wages per
worker
Total wages paid to all the employed in
a county divided by the total number
of people employed in the same county
Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Quarterly
Census of Employ-
ment and Wages
Violent torna-
does
Tornadoes classified as EF-4 and EF-5 National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration’s Storm
Events Database
Large tornadoes Tornadoes classified as EF-2 and higher National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration’s Storm
Events Database
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A.1.2 Robustness Checks
Figure A.1: Effect of violent tornadoes on labor market outcomes (all industries) -
(20 lags)
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Note: The solid line plots the response of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line plots
the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the direct effects and the lower panel plots
the neighboring effects
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Figure A.2: Multiplier effect of violent tornadoes on labor market outcomes (all
industries) of directly affected urban and rural counties - (20 lags)
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Note: The solid line plots the multiplier effect of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line
plots the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the effect on Urban counties and the
lower panel plots effects for Rural counties
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Figure A.3: Multiplier effect of violent tornadoes on labor market outcomes (all
industries) of neighboring urban and rural counties - (20 lags)
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Note: The solid line plots the multiplier effect of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line
plots the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the effect on Urban counties and the
lower panel plots effects for Rural counties
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Figure A.4: Effect of violent tornadoes on labor market outcomes (all industries) -
Midwest and Southern Regions
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Note: The solid line plots the response of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line plots
the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the direct effects and the lower panel plots
the neighboring effects
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Figure A.5: Effect of violent tornadoes on labor market outcomes (all industries) -
Pooling
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Note: The solid line plots the response of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line plots
the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the direct effects and the lower panel plots
the neighboring effects
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Figure A.6: Effect of violent tornadoes on labor market outcomes (all industries) -
Local Projection
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Note: The solid line plots the response of employment or wages per worker. The dotted line plots
the 90% confidence interval. The top panel illustrates the direct effects and the lower panel plots
the neighboring effects
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A.2 Chapter 2 Appendix
A.2.1 Data Appendix
Although the Global Terrorist Database (GTD) includes data on both domestic and
transnational terrorist attacks, it does not identify them separately. For this reason,
I follow Enders et. al (2011) to distinguish between domestic and transnational
terrorist attack from the GTD database as follows:
1. Exclude events that do not satisfy the three conditions defined by the GTD
dataset as a terrorist attack.
2. The dataset flags some incidents as doubtful. Remove these events.
3. The next five steps identify transnational terrorist incidents from among the
remaining observations
a) GTD reports the nationality of three victims. If the nationality of even
one of these victims is different from the target country reported by GTD,
identify the observation as a transnational terrorist attack.
b) Foreign emissaries, embassies, consulates, and diplomatic staff, families,
and property along with non-government organizations (NGO) that are
mostly multinational in nature are considered diplomatic entities. Based
on the target type identified by GTD, an incident targeting a diplomatic
entity, or an NGO is considered transnational.
c) If GTD identifies that an incident targeted a U.S. entity outside of the
USA or an international entity like the UN, classify that incident as a
transnational terror attack.
d) U.S. specific information like fatalities, hostages, wounded etc. are re-
ported separately by GTD. If these reports indicate that a U.S specific
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event may have occurred outside of the USA, identify the incident as a
transnational terror attack.
e) GTD reports the concluding country of hijackings or kidnappings. It also
specifies if there was a diversion. If this country is different from the origin
country the event is a transnational incident.
f) In addition to the above steps described by Enders et al. (2011), I identify
incidents that the GTD database discerns as having international ideolo-
gies or geography as transnational terrorist incidents.
4. Any incident from among the observations that have not been identified as
transnational, that has information missing about the nationality of the vic-
tims, or the target type is considered uncertain. Also incidents that are missing
information about U.S. fatalities, wounded, hijackings, or ransoms are consid-
ered uncertain. I drop these uncertain incidents.
5. Any incident that has not been identified as transnational or uncertain is clas-
sified as a domestic terrorist incident.
A.2.1.1 Definitions and Sources
Table A.2: Definitions and Sources of the Variables
Variable Definitions Source
GDP per capita The real GDP per capita in US dollars World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
I/GDP (Gross
fixed capital
formation as a
share of GDP)
This measure includes land improve-
ments, equipment purchases, and con-
struction of infrastructure, buildings -
private and public.
World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
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Military Ex-
penditures as a
share of GDP
This measures includes expenditures on
armed forces, paramilitary fores, and
military space activities. It includes
expenses on military research and de-
velopmet, military aid, and personnel
expenditures. It however, does not in-
clude expenditures for previous mili-
tary activities.
World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
G/GDP (Gov-
ernment Con-
sumption Ex-
penditures as a
share of GDP)
This includes all government expendi-
tures for purchases of goods and ser-
vices. It also includes employee wages
and national defense and security ex-
penditures. However, it excludes mil-
itary expenditures that would be con-
sidered part of government capital for-
mation
World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
Non-military ex-
penditures as a
share of GDP
This is government consumption ex-
penditure as a share of GDP minus mil-
itary expenditures as a share of GDP
Population This is the total population of a coun-
try
World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
Educational at-
tainment
This variable is the percentage of pop-
ulation that has completed a secondary
education.
Barro and Lee (2013)
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Polity 2 This variable is the polity2 score re-
ported by the Polity IV dataset. It
scores a country based on democratic
or autocratic status.
Polity IV
Natural disas-
ters
Disasters that have been identified as
floods, storms, or earthquake
Emergency Disaster
Database (EM-DAT)
Terrorist attacks Violent incidents perpetrated by indi-
viduals or groups for a political or reli-
gious reason.
Global Terrorism
Database (GTD)
Transnational
terrorist attacks
Terrorist incidents that involve more
than one country. The country of
victims, and/or perpetrators can vary.
The target country could also be differ-
ent from the country where the incident
occurred.
Global Terrorism
Database (GTD)
Domestic terror-
ist attacks
Terrorist incidents that involve only
one country. The victims, target, and
the perpetrators are from the same
country.
Global Terrorism
Database (GTD)
A.2.2 List of Countries
Developed Countries:
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United King-
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dom, United States, Uruguay.
Emerging Countries:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Re-
public, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini (Swaziland),
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic,
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philip-
pines, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
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A.2.3 Robustness Check
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Table A.3: Estimation of Growth Model (Non-Linear Specification)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.6590
∗ -0.6592∗
(0.3729) (0.3693)
Terror2it 4.2931
∗ 4.2849∗
(2.3787) (2.3516)
Transnationalit -0.5798
(0.7655)
Transnational2it 4.0024
(3.7866)
Domesticit -0.5655
(0.5510)
Domestic2it 3.5397
(4.8365)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0465
∗∗∗ -0.0465∗∗∗
(0.0161) (0.0162)
NaturalDisaster2it 0.0130
∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0045)
Floodit -0.6042
∗
(0.3444)
Flood2it 0.4251
(0.2700)
Earthquakeit -0.0293
∗
(0.0175)
Earthquake2it 0.0086
∗
(0.0047)
Stormit -0.0073
(0.0247)
Storm2it -0.0041
(0.0094)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is GDP growth, the data spans from 1970
to 2015. The variables of interest are the intensity measure of transnational
terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms and the square
of the intensity. The intensity measure is the number of deaths per thou-
sand caused by an event.The controls included in the specification are initial
GDP per capita, educational attainment, population growth, polity 2 score,
investment, government consumption.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.4: Estimation of Growth Model (Robustness Check - Dummy Variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0031) (0.0031)
Transnationalit 0.0004
(0.0033)
Domesticit -0.0018
(0.0036)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0054
∗ -0.0054∗
(0.0027) (0.0027)
Floodit -0.0024
(0.0028)
Earthquakeit -0.0012
(0.0055)
Stormit -0.0032
(0.0028)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0443∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058)
ln(Education)it -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0035
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Populationgrowthit -0.5545
∗∗∗ -0.5525∗∗∗ -0.5542∗∗∗ -0.5568∗∗∗
(0.1766) (0.1775) (0.1762) (0.1749)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)
ln(trade)it−1 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0066)
Polityit 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is GDP growth, the data spans from 1970 to
2015. The variables of interest are the dummy variables of terrorism, transnational
terrorism, domestic terrorism, natural disasters, floods, earthquake, and storms.
The dummy variable takes the value one if the number of deaths in a country in a
given year due to a certain type of event exceeds 75 percentile of the worlds pooled
distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.5: Estimation of Investment Model (Robustness Check - Dummy Variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit 0.0173 0.0172
(0.0223) (0.0223)
Transnationalit 0.0196
(0.0202)
Domesticit 0.0078
(0.0259)
NaturalDisasterit 0.0069 0.0067
(0.0118) (0.0118)
Floodit 0.0223
(0.0151)
Earthquakeit 0.0024
(0.0144)
Stormit 0.0171
(0.0237)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.1259∗∗ 0.1245∗∗ 0.1263∗∗ 0.1277∗∗
(0.0582) (0.0579) (0.0583) (0.0582)
ln(Education)it 0.0831
∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0831∗∗∗ 0.0827∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0284)
Populationgrowthit 3.9037
∗∗∗ 3.8596∗∗∗ 3.9029∗∗∗ 3.9039∗∗∗
(1.3964) (1.4003) (1.3965) (1.3926)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0809 -0.0804 -0.0808 -0.0799
(0.0497) (0.0500) (0.0497) (0.0498)
ln(trade)it−1 0.2763∗∗∗ 0.2759∗∗∗ 0.2765∗∗∗ 0.2775∗∗∗
(0.0585) (0.0586) (0.0585) (0.0585)
Polityit 0.0058
∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0057∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of Investment (% of
GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the
dummy variables of terrorism, transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, nat-
ural disasters, floods, earthquake, and storms. The dummy variable takes the
value one if the number of deaths in a country in a given year due to a certain
type of event exceeds 75 percentile of the worlds pooled distribution of deaths
caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.6: Estimation of Military Expenditures Model (Robustness Check - Dummy
Variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit 0.0979
∗∗∗ 0.0978∗∗∗
(0.0358) (0.0358)
Transnationalit 0.0576
∗
(0.0324)
Domesticit 0.0915
∗∗∗
(0.0337)
NaturalDisasterit 0.0064 0.0054
(0.0106) (0.0109)
Floodit 0.0104
(0.0141)
Earthquakeit 0.0196
(0.0187)
Stormit -0.0035
(0.0152)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0545 -0.0643 -0.0541 -0.0530
(0.0703) (0.0704) (0.0703) (0.0701)
ln(Education)it 0.0260 0.0295 0.0259 0.0265
(0.0351) (0.0346) (0.0351) (0.0350)
Populationgrowthit -2.3382 -2.5824
∗ -2.3397 -2.3209
(1.5274) (1.5409) (1.5268) (1.5165)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0457 0.0463 0.0456 0.0444
(0.0404) (0.0409) (0.0404) (0.0402)
ln(trade)it−1 -0.0681 -0.0726 -0.0678 -0.0652
(0.0460) (0.0467) (0.0460) (0.0458)
Polityit -0.0105
∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of military expenditures
(% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the
dummy variables of terrorism, transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, natural
disasters, floods, earthquake, and storms. The dummy variable takes the value one
if the number of deaths in a country in a given year due to a certain type of event
exceeds 75 percentile of the worlds pooled distribution of deaths caused by that
event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.7: Estimation of Non-Military Government Expenditures Model (Robustness
Check - Dummy Variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.0385
∗ -0.0386∗
(0.0200) (0.0200)
Transnationalit -0.0281
(0.0189)
Domesticit -0.0214
(0.0241)
NaturalDisasterit 0.0092 0.0096
(0.0113) (0.0113)
Floodit -0.0013
(0.0138)
Earthquakeit 0.0230
(0.0153)
Stormit 0.0152
(0.0160)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.0483 0.0530 0.0490 0.0485
(0.0659) (0.0654) (0.0659) (0.0659)
ln(Education)it 0.0124 0.0109 0.0123 0.0121
(0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0275)
Populationgrowthit -1.9508 -1.8576 -1.9535 -1.9381
(1.3909) (1.3961) (1.3908) (1.3904)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 -0.0439 -0.0444 -0.0441 -0.0436
(0.0411) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0410)
ln(trade)it−1 0.1523∗∗∗ 0.1548∗∗∗ 0.1529∗∗∗ 0.1526∗∗∗
(0.0537) (0.0539) (0.0539) (0.0541)
Polityit 0.0124
∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of non-military expendi-
tures (% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are
the dummy variables of terrorism, transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism,
natural disasters, floods, earthquake, and storms. The dummy variable takes
the value one if the number of deaths in a country in a given year due to a
certain type of event exceeds 75 percentile of the worlds pooled distribution of
deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.8: Estimation of Growth Model (Robustness Check - All Events)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.2486 -0.2492
(0.2353) (0.2352)
Transnationalit -0.1675
(0.4770)
Domesticit -0.3040
∗
(0.1769)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0197
∗ -0.0198∗
(0.0114) (0.0114)
Floodit -0.1397
∗∗∗
(0.0511)
Earthquakeit -0.0050
(0.0088)
Stormit -0.0314
∗∗∗
(0.0116)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0446∗∗∗ -0.0440∗∗∗ -0.0444∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058)
ln(Education)it -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0035
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Populationgrowthit -0.5575
∗∗∗ -0.5518∗∗∗ -0.5566∗∗∗ -0.5612∗∗∗
(0.1757) (0.1779) (0.1758) (0.1758)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0164∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0164∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0059)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)
ln(trade)it−1 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Polityit 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is GDP growth, the data spans from 1970
to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log of the intensity measure of
transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms. The
intensity measure is the number of deaths per thousand caused by an event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.9: Estimation of Investment Model (Robustness Check - All Events)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.5325 -0.5331
(0.9754) (0.9749)
Transnationalit -0.6933
(1.5240)
Domesticit -0.4162
(0.9928)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0204 -0.0205
(0.0680) (0.0680)
Floodit 0.2424
(0.1662)
Earthquakeit -0.0370
(0.0862)
Stormit -0.0443
(0.0636)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.1234∗∗ 0.1243∗∗ 0.1236∗∗ 0.1239∗∗
(0.0582) (0.0578) (0.0582) (0.0582)
ln(Education)it 0.0838
∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0287)
Populationgrowthit 3.8494
∗∗∗ 3.8608∗∗∗ 3.8500∗∗∗ 3.8594∗∗∗
(1.3865) (1.4004) (1.3866) (1.3981)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0804 -0.0806 -0.0805 -0.0807
(0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0498)
ln(trade)it−1 0.2754∗∗∗ 0.2755∗∗∗ 0.2753∗∗∗ 0.2755∗∗∗
(0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0587)
Polityit 0.0058
∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0058∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of Investment (% of GDP),
the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log
of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods,
earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths per
thousand caused by an event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.10: Estimation of Military Expenditures Model (Robustness Check - All
Events)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit 4.5403
∗∗ 4.5415∗∗
(1.8030) (1.8042)
Transnationalit 2.5224
(2.8238)
Domesticit 5.9648
∗∗∗
(1.4972)
NaturalDisasterit 0.0360 0.0373
(0.0459) (0.0477)
Floodit -0.0127
(0.1044)
Earthquakeit 0.0962
(0.0717)
Stormit -0.1204
(0.0845)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0585 -0.0653 -0.0590 -0.0593
(0.0699) (0.0703) (0.0699) (0.0696)
ln(Education)it 0.0280 0.0295 0.0280 0.0276
(0.0350) (0.0346) (0.0350) (0.0351)
Populationgrowthit -2.5082 -2.5826
∗ -2.5100 -2.4098
(1.6148) (1.5416) (1.6147) (1.5383)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0490 0.0467 0.0492 0.0493
(0.0404) (0.0409) (0.0405) (0.0405)
ln(trade)it−1 -0.0712 -0.0729 -0.0710 -0.0703
(0.0464) (0.0467) (0.0464) (0.0462)
Polityit -0.0103
∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0102∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of military expenditures
(% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the
natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism,
floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths per
thousand caused by an event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.11: Estimation of Non-Military Government Expenditures Model (Robust-
ness Check - All Events)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -1.3714 -1.3723
(1.1389) (1.1389)
Transnationalit 0.4396
(1.7934)
Domesticit -2.6945
∗
(1.5440)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0278 -0.0282
(0.0436) (0.0434)
Floodit 0.1841
∗∗
(0.0746)
Earthquakeit -0.0423
(0.0552)
Stormit -0.0556
(0.0343)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.0505 0.0527 0.0508 0.0511
(0.0655) (0.0655) (0.0656) (0.0656)
ln(Education)it 0.0115 0.0110 0.0115 0.0119
(0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0276)
Populationgrowthit -1.8773 -1.8540 -1.8759 -1.9633
(1.4013) (1.3965) (1.4016) (1.3903)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 -0.0449 -0.0443 -0.0451 -0.0455
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412)
ln(trade)it−1 0.1537∗∗∗ 0.1541∗∗∗ 0.1536∗∗∗ 0.1527∗∗∗
(0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0536)
Polityit 0.0123
∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of non-military expen-
ditures (% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest
are the natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic
terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number
of deaths per thousand caused by an event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.12: Estimation of Growth Model (Robustness Check - 90th percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.2685 -0.2692
(0.2363) (0.2362)
Transnationalit -0.1676
(0.4770)
Domesticit -0.3210
∗
(0.1770)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0194
∗ -0.0195∗
(0.0114) (0.0114)
Floodit -0.1423
∗∗∗
(0.0526)
Earthquakeit -0.0054
(0.0090)
Stormit -0.0315
∗∗∗
(0.0115)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0446∗∗∗ -0.0440∗∗∗ -0.0444∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058)
ln(Education)it -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0035
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Populationgrowthit -0.5576
∗∗∗ -0.5518∗∗∗ -0.5568∗∗∗ -0.5615∗∗∗
(0.1757) (0.1779) (0.1757) (0.1757)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0164∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0164∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0059)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)
ln(trade)it−1 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Polityit 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is GDP growth, the data spans from 1970
to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log of the intensity measure of
transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms. The
intensity measure is the number of deaths per thousand caused by an event when
it exceeds the 90th percentile of the worlds pooled distribution of deaths caused by
that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.13: Estimation of Investment Model (Robustness Check - 90th percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.6477 -0.6486
(0.9651) (0.9644)
Transnationalit -0.6651
(1.5226)
Domesticit -0.5604
(0.9806)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0254 -0.0256
(0.0678) (0.0679)
Floodit 0.1992
(0.1974)
Earthquakeit -0.0385
(0.0863)
Stormit -0.0458
(0.0637)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.1233∗∗ 0.1244∗∗ 0.1235∗∗ 0.1238∗∗
(0.0582) (0.0578) (0.0582) (0.0582)
ln(Education)it 0.0838
∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.0839∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0287)
Populationgrowthit 3.8474
∗∗∗ 3.8610∗∗∗ 3.8483∗∗∗ 3.8535∗∗∗
(1.3845) (1.4004) (1.3846) (1.3983)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0803 -0.0806 -0.0805 -0.0808
(0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0498)
ln(trade)it−1 0.2754∗∗∗ 0.2755∗∗∗ 0.2752∗∗∗ 0.2755∗∗∗
(0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0587)
Polityit 0.0058
∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0058∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of Investment (% of GDP),
the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log
of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods,
earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths per
thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 90th percentile of the worlds
pooled distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.14: Estimation of Military Expenditures Model (Robustness Check - 90th
percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit 4.3307
∗∗ 4.3321∗∗
(1.7199) (1.7214)
Transnationalit 2.4260
(2.7838)
Domesticit 5.8545
∗∗∗
(1.4620)
NaturalDisasterit 0.0336 0.0352
(0.0454) (0.0475)
Floodit -0.0045
(0.1060)
Earthquakeit 0.0985
(0.0730)
Stormit -0.1188
(0.0842)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0591 -0.0653 -0.0596 -0.0597
(0.0700) (0.0703) (0.0699) (0.0696)
ln(Education)it 0.0283 0.0295 0.0283 0.0278
(0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0350) (0.0351)
Populationgrowthit -2.5146 -2.5825
∗ -2.5164 -2.4141
(1.6102) (1.5416) (1.6102) (1.5364)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0490 0.0466 0.0492 0.0493
(0.0404) (0.0409) (0.0405) (0.0405)
ln(trade)it−1 -0.0714 -0.0729 -0.0713 -0.0705
(0.0464) (0.0467) (0.0464) (0.0462)
Polityit -0.0103
∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0102∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of military expenditures
(% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the
natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism,
floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths
per thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 90th percentile of the worlds
pooled distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.15: Estimation of Non-Military Government Expenditures Model (Robust-
ness Check - 90th percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -1.3047 -1.3057
(1.1247) (1.1248)
Transnationalit 0.5603
(1.8183)
Domesticit -2.7806
∗
(1.5453)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0248 -0.0253
(0.0439) (0.0436)
Floodit 0.2150
∗∗
(0.0827)
Earthquakeit -0.0455
(0.0550)
Stormit -0.0577
∗
(0.0335)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.0506 0.0527 0.0510 0.0512
(0.0655) (0.0655) (0.0656) (0.0656)
ln(Education)it 0.0114 0.0110 0.0114 0.0119
(0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0276)
Populationgrowthit -1.8753 -1.8540 -1.8740 -1.9693
(1.4002) (1.3965) (1.4005) (1.3887)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 -0.0449 -0.0443 -0.0451 -0.0456
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0411)
ln(trade)it−1 0.1538∗∗∗ 0.1542∗∗∗ 0.1537∗∗∗ 0.1527∗∗∗
(0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0536)
Polityit 0.0123
∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of non-military expen-
ditures (% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest
are the natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic
terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number
of deaths per thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 90th percentile
of the worlds pooled distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.16: Estimation of Growth Model (Robustness Check - 99th percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.1996 -0.2004
(0.1944) (0.1945)
Transnationalit -0.1694
(0.4830)
Domesticit -0.1351
(0.1167)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0163 -0.0163
(0.0115) (0.0115)
Floodit -0.1421
∗∗
(0.0546)
Earthquakeit 0.0014
(0.0065)
Stormit -0.0268
∗∗
(0.0133)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0444∗∗∗ -0.0441∗∗∗ -0.0442∗∗∗ -0.0444∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058)
ln(Education)it -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0036
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Populationgrowthit -0.5532
∗∗∗ -0.5520∗∗∗ -0.5526∗∗∗ -0.5535∗∗∗
(0.1768) (0.1780) (0.1768) (0.1782)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0164∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0059)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0154∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)
ln(trade)it−1 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0323∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Polityit 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is GDP growth, the data spans from 1970
to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log of the intensity measure of
transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms. The
intensity measure is the number of deaths per thousand caused by an event when
it exceeds the 99th percentile of the worlds pooled distribution of deaths caused by
that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.17: Estimation of Investment Model (Robustness Check - 99th percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.6348 -0.6354
(0.6514) (0.6513)
Transnationalit -1.5044
(1.1683)
Domesticit 0.2332
(0.8485)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0135 -0.0138
(0.0696) (0.0696)
Floodit 0.2419
(0.1663)
Earthquakeit -0.0465
(0.0948)
Stormit -0.0612
(0.0560)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.1236∗∗ 0.1242∗∗ 0.1237∗∗ 0.1242∗∗
(0.0580) (0.0578) (0.0579) (0.0579)
ln(Education)it 0.0837
∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.0837∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0287)
Populationgrowthit 3.8576
∗∗∗ 3.8605∗∗∗ 3.8579∗∗∗ 3.8968∗∗∗
(1.3887) (1.4003) (1.3888) (1.3979)
ln(G/GDP )it−1 -0.0804 -0.0806 -0.0805 -0.0806
(0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0498)
ln(trade)it−1 0.2754∗∗∗ 0.2756∗∗∗ 0.2753∗∗∗ 0.2760∗∗∗
(0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0587)
Polityit 0.0058
∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0058∗∗ 0.0058∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
N 4600 4600 4600 4600
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of Investment (% of GDP),
the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the natural log
of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism, floods,
earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths per
thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 99th percentile of the worlds
pooled distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.18: Estimation of Military Expenditures Model(Robustness Check - 99th
percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit 1.9240
∗ 1.9261∗
(1.1550) (1.1542)
Transnationalit 1.9569
(2.3849)
Domesticit 2.2001
∗
(1.1752)
NaturalDisasterit 0.0442 0.0450
(0.0476) (0.0483)
Floodit -0.0341
(0.0859)
Earthquakeit 0.0984
(0.0807)
Stormit -0.0931
(0.0741)
ln(GDP )it−1 -0.0631 -0.0654 -0.0637 -0.0638
(0.0701) (0.0703) (0.0700) (0.0698)
ln(Education)it 0.0291 0.0295 0.0291 0.0288
(0.0347) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.0348)
Populationgrowthit -2.5802 -2.5827
∗ -2.5821 -2.5680∗
(1.5706) (1.5417) (1.5706) (1.5414)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 0.0476 0.0467 0.0478 0.0481
(0.0407) (0.0409) (0.0407) (0.0407)
ln(trade)it−1 -0.0725 -0.0729 -0.0724 -0.0730
(0.0466) (0.0467) (0.0466) (0.0468)
Polityit -0.0104
∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of military expenditures
(% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest are the
natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism,
floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number of deaths
per thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 99th percentile of the worlds
pooled distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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Table A.19: Estimation of Non-Military Government Expenditures Model (Robust-
ness Check - 99th percentile)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Terrorit -0.7494 -0.7510
(1.1589) (1.1589)
Transnationalit 0.4544
(1.9115)
Domesticit -1.8673
(1.8170)
NaturalDisasterit -0.0326 -0.0329
(0.0429) (0.0428)
Floodit 0.1611
∗∗
(0.0677)
Earthquakeit -0.0392
(0.0580)
Stormit -0.0698
∗
(0.0362)
ln(GDP )it−1 0.0517 0.0528 0.0522 0.0522
(0.0654) (0.0655) (0.0654) (0.0655)
ln(Education)it 0.0112 0.0110 0.0112 0.0116
(0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0275)
Populationgrowthit -1.8556 -1.8539 -1.8541 -1.9066
(1.4020) (1.3965) (1.4023) (1.3960)
ln(I/GDP )it−1 -0.0446 -0.0443 -0.0448 -0.0452
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412)
ln(trade)it−1 0.1540∗∗∗ 0.1542∗∗∗ 0.1540∗∗∗ 0.1536∗∗∗
(0.0536) (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0535)
Polityit 0.0124
∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0124∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
N 4293 4293 4293 4293
Standard errors in parentheses
The dependent variable in this table is the natural log of non-military expen-
ditures (% GDP), the data spans from 1970 to 2015. The variables of interest
are the natural log of the intensity measure of transnational terrorism, domestic
terrorism, floods, earthquake, and storms. The intensity measure is the number
of deaths per thousand caused by an event when it exceeds the 99th percentile
of the worlds pooled distribution of deaths caused by that event.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.010
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A.3 Chapter 3 Appendix
A.3.1 Data Appendix
A.3.1.1 Definitions and Sources
Table A.20: Definitions and Sources of the Variables
Variable Definitions Source
GDP per capita The real GDP per capita in US dollars World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
Industry, value
added per capita
Industry, value added in constant US
dollars divided by the population
World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
Service, value
added per capita
Services, value added in constant US
dollars divided by the population
World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
Agriculture,
value added per
capita
Agriculture, value added in constant
US dollars divided by the population
World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
I/GDP (Gross
fixed capital
formation as a
share of GDP)
This measure includes land improve-
ments, equipment purchases, and con-
struction of infrastructure, buildings -
private and public.
World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
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G/GDP (Gov-
ernment Con-
sumption Ex-
penditures as a
share of GDP)
This includes all government expendi-
tures for purchases of goods and ser-
vices. It also includes employee wages
and national defense and security ex-
penditures. However, it excludes mil-
itary expenditures that would be con-
sidered part of government capital for-
mation
World Bank’s World
Development Indica-
tors
Terrorist attacks Violent incidents perpetrated by indi-
viduals or groups for a political or reli-
gious reason.
Global Terrorism
Database (GTD)
Transnational
terrorist attacks
Terrorist incidents that involve more
than one country. The country of
victims, and/or perpetrators can vary.
The target country could also be differ-
ent from the country where the incident
occurred.
Global Terrorism
Database (GTD)
Domestic terror-
ist attacks
Terrorist incidents that involve only
one country. The victims, target, and
the perpetrators are from the same
country.
Global Terrorism
Database (GTD)
A.3.1.2 List of Countries
Emerging Countries:
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
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Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indone-
sia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, West
Bank and Gaza.
Remaining Countries:
Australia, Austria, The Bahamas, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.
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A.3.2 Robustness Check
Figure A.7: Cumulative Response of GDP Growth (Terrorism Variable Ordering)
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of GDP growth to a one standard deviation
shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transnational and
domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transnational terrorism and
the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line plots the response
while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval. This figure reverses the order of the
terrorism variables to transnational terrorism and then domestic terrorism.
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Figure A.8: Cumulative Response of Industrial Sector Growth (Terrorism Variable
Ordering)
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of industrial sector growth to a one standard
deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transna-
tional and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transnational
terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line plots
the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval. This figure reverses
the order of the terrorism variables to transnational terrorism and then domestic terrorism.
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Figure A.9: Cumulative Response of Service Sector Growth (Terrorism Variable Or-
dering)
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of service sector growth to a one standard
deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transna-
tional and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transnational
terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line plots
the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval. This figure reverses
the order of the terrorism variables to transnational terrorism and then domestic terrorism.
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Figure A.10: Cumulative Response of Agricultural Sector Growth (Terrorism Variable
Ordering)
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of agricultural sector growth to a one stan-
dard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by
transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transna-
tional terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid
line plots the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval. This figure
reverses the order of the terrorism variables to transnational terrorism and then domestic terrorism.
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Figure A.11: Cumulative Response of GDP Growth (Macroeconomic Variable Order-
ing)
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of GDP growth to a one standard deviation
shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transnational and
domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transnational terrorism and the
figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line plots the response while
the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval. This figure reverses the order of capital
formation and government consumption to government expenditures and then capital formation.
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Figure A.12: Cumulative Response of Industrial Sector Growth (Macroeconomic Vari-
able Ordering)
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of industrial sector growth to a one standard
deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transna-
tional and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transnational
terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line plots
the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval. This figure reverses
the order of capital formation and government consumption to government expenditures and then
capital formation.
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Figure A.13: Cumulative Response of Service Sector Growth (Macroeconomic Vari-
able Ordering)
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of service sector growth to a one standard
deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by transna-
tional and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transnational
terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid line plots
the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval. This figure reverses
the order of capital formation and government consumption to government expenditures and then
capital formation.
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Figure A.14: Cumulative Response of Agricultural Sector Growth (Macroeconomic
Variable Ordering)
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Note: The figures plot the cumulative impulse response of agricultural sector growth to a one stan-
dard deviation shock to the number of deaths per thousand inhabitants of a country caused by
transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. The figure on the left plots the response to transna-
tional terrorism and the figure on the right plots the response to domestic terrorism. The solid
line plots the response while the shaded region represents the 90% confidence interval. This figure
reverses the order of capital formation and government consumption to government expenditures
and then capital formation.
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